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Iako ovaj broj *Medijskih studija* originalno nije bio zamišljen kao tematski broj, dogodilo se da su u njega izabrani redom članci međusobno povezani problematiziranjem interneta i novih medija, prije svega problematiziranjem komunikacije na društvenim mrežama. Svi su članci, osim prvoga, na neki način inspirirani raspravama s konferencije Informacijska tehnologija i novinarstvo koja se u svibnju ove godine osamnaesti put održala u Interuniverzitetskom centru u Dubrovniku. Stoga smo i zamolili profesora Nenađa Preloga, osnivača te konferencije, da se u tematskom bloku *Društvene mreže i politička komunikacija* uvodno osvrne na njezinu „punoljetnost“. U člancima koji slijede autorice i autori problematiziraju političku komunikaciju na društvenim mrežama i drugim internetnim platformama. U fokusu tih istraživanja našli su se politički kandidati na nacionalnim i lokalnim izborima u Italiji, Bugarskoj, Hrvatskoj, Mađarskoj, Makedoniji i Sloveniji. Raspravi svakako pridonosi i rad koji istražuje u kojoj mjeri i na koji način novinarka i novinari u središnjim informativnim televizijskim emisijama u Hrvatskoj koriste društvene mreže kao izvor vijesti.

Inače, ovaj 8. broj *Medijskih studija* otvaramo člankom o medijskoj pismenosti, temi koja je poslije našeg tematskog broja 6 *Critical Insights in European Media Literacy Research and Policy* postala „vruća“ politička tema u Hrvatskoj i regiji.

Ovim brojem zatvaramo prvi četverogodišnji urednički mandat, i odmah otvaramo novi, u istom sastavu. Sretni smo što je časopis opstao u vremenima ekonomske krize i vrlo oskudnih financijskih potpora. Posebno nas veseli što su *Medijske studije* u Hrvatskoj i u regiji prepoznate kao relevantan znanstveni časopis, a polako, ali sigurno, grade i svoju međunarodnu reputaciju.

I na kraju, zahvalni smo Ministarstvu znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta RH što je u četvrtom godištu izlaženja *Medijskih studija* prepoznalo vrijednost ovog časopisa u poticanju znanstveno-istraživačkog stvaralaštava na nacionalnoj i međunarodnoj razini te ga je od ove godine odlučilo i financijski poduprijeti.

Viktorija Car
glavna urednica

UVODNA BILJEŠKA

EDITOR'S NOTE

Although this issue of *Media Studies* was not originally intended as a special issue, it happened that this selection of articles are interconnected as almost all of them address the Internet and new media, particularly communication on social networks. All articles, except for the first one, were in some way inspired by discussions during the 18th Information Technology and Journalism Conference in Dubrovnik this past May. Therefore, we asked Professor Nenad Prelog, the founder of the conference, to write an introduction for the themes of this issue. In the papers that follow, the authors discuss political communication on social networks and other online platforms. In the focus of this research are political candidates, in national and local elections in Italy, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia and Slovenia. Certainly, a good contribution to the discussion is a paper that explores to what extent and how journalists and reporters on television news in Croatia use social networks as a source of information.

This 8th issue of *Media Studies* opens with an article on media literacy, a topic that, after our special issue *Critical Insights in European Media Literacy Research and Policy* (issue 6), has become a 'hot' policy topic in Croatia and the region.

With this issue we close the first four years of our editorial mandate, and immediately open a new one, with the same team of editors. We are happy that the journal has survived during these times of economic crisis and very scarce funding. We are especially pleased that *Media Studies* is recognized as a relevant scientific journal in Croatia and the region, and slowly but surely, we are building its international reputation.

Finally, we are grateful to the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports which has finally recognized *Media Studies* as a valuable promoter of scientific research and creative discussions at the national and international level, and from this year on, decided to financially support our journal.

Viktorija Car
Editor-in-Chief

MEDIA LITERACY IN TIMES OF MEDIA DIVIDES

Kaja Žuran :: Marko Ivanišin

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ABSTRACT *We live in a post-modern society, an information society, a society based around knowledge and participation, and above all in a media society. In a media culture where media holds a dominant position, we cannot overlook the emerging idea of a 'media divide' within the frame of media education, media literate individuals and the expansion of the traditional concept of media literacy. Firstly, we are in an era of technological revolution, and it is time to consider the meaning and function of media and how we experience it in our everyday life. Secondly, as a society we are subject to intense media invasion and we all need to learn how to use it to our benefit and apply a critical and autonomous perspective towards selecting media content. Otherwise the media divide between the media literate and illiterate will widen; but is there even a chance to overcome the supposed divide between those who are formally media educated and those who are not?*

KEY WORDS

MEDIA LITERACY, MEDIA EDUCATION, MEDIA DIVIDE

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PREFACE

Without media and communication, there is no such thing as modern society as the media with its messages connects and hold different societies together. We could say they are society's component and condition; without their dominant and participatory use, individuals can hardly imagine their daily life in which they live, work, learn, and are politically and culturally active. Media are everywhere and can sometimes act intrusively, especially to adolescents and children, who assert themselves in relation to media. Media are the scale for 'up to date' (Wakounig, 2009: 8), which enable them to master media content and the capability of creating an appearance of the world, which would be unknown to us without the media. As József Györkös states: "The transition to an information society, brings with it an extreme openness and free unsupervised access to information and communication" (1998: 81) and speaks of media contents as authorities, which co-design our norms, goals, values, attitude and behavior. On the other side, never in the past has information spread and was received in such quantities and speed, so media life is becoming "the possession of the world auditorium and not the privilege of the chosen ones" (Borčić, 1997: 50), which means, that everybody can not only access the media and use them, but also create them. It is paradoxical, that on one side, the media are capable of overseeing our knowledge, relationships and behavior – so we are 'drowned' in media, which are controlling us; but at the same time, as James Potter indicates, we have bigger potential than ever before, to control our media exposure and media influences (Potter, 2004).

Louis Althusser as a Marxist theoretic set a question, what is actually the role of the ideological apparatus of the state, and on what is their importance based on (Althusser, 1980). Although, at that time he was referring to the church, family and school, which he marks as the dominant ideological apparatus, nowadays we know that the media as an information apparatus, are also those who have ideological values. The cultural environment is almost fully altered with new media experiences, therefore the 'ostrich posture', as states Manca Košir, seems amusing. "It is time we face the media culture, which we created and consumed." (Hobbs, in Košir and Ranfl, 1996: 29)

This follows the need for media literacy – so that individuals can control the media in a sense of controlling their own lives, not the society – they have to be media literate. It is necessary to adjust to new conditions and exploitation of its preferences. How? For a start with a different and improved approach to media literacy and media education, expansion of the media literacy concept, and overcoming of media divides. Latter will be represented in this article. Namely fulfilment of media literacy from the side of most individuals; beside above mentioned benefits, bridge the gap or divide between literate and illiterate, between those who are a part of a formal media education and those who are not. Media divide is (just) an obstacle in the development of the media literate sphere. Is its bridging a utopian idea or potentially plausible?

FROM DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIA PEDAGOGY

Little time has passed since the reduction hypothesis, which saw in media a negative influence on individuals as well as on their literacy, over to traditionalistic 'protectionist' approach of media education which protected individuals from media addiction and manipulation, to the importance of critical thinking and nowadays own active media creation. History of media pedagogy, education and media literacy is so rather short but branched – her enforcement at the end of 20th and beginning of 21st century yet a result of technical progress and media-pedagogical conflicts of interest and power. In an individual oriented concept of media literacy, which spread with education 'media awareness' among individuals; we consequently pass through the approach of 'protection and prevention' as a protectionist perspective in the sixties, 'critical content analysis' as demystification perspective in the eighties, and concept of 'do it yourself experience', 'reflecting on own context of life', and 'creative production' as participative perspective in the middle of the nineties (European Commission Media, 2007; Frau-Meigs, 2006).

The above perspectives occur and became dominant in approximate chronological order, it is mainly only about a descriptive concepts of pedagogical trends and not the overview of reality, because the latter is not completely determinable through strict and clear theoretical models (European Commission Media, 2007).

Development is happening so to say on its own, and we do not see it as a progression, because the shift of focus owes to gradual changes in ideological dominance, as also to progress in technical and pedagogical practice. Initial protectionist reasons of media education still follow practice, and it would be wrong to consider them as insufficient, because they indicate support to alternative ideological systems of belief and not wrong practice. Even more, the upcoming changes in media environment are likely to cause new pressures and demands in media education. What seems today as the best practice and completely legitimate approach, will perhaps not be appropriate for tomorrow's media education needs (Leaning, 2009). Why? Firstly, because of the above mentioned changes in the environment, consequently also because of evolving definitions of media literacy and its demands.

TO CHANGES OF MEDIA LITERACY PARADIGMS

Finding that for the functioning within the present media environment and society, which is the basis of academic discussions about media literacy, is necessarily complex and width model of literacy, is therefore on the spot.

Traditional literacy no longer suffices – it is necessary to develop new skills and abilities (in continue competence), which enable literacy in context of current time. Up until now we approached media literacy on the basis of theories and paradigms. Some definitions lean on the approach of cultural studies, feministic theories or epistemological, cognitive approach, sociological and political paradigms or they are approached without

any theoretical basis when media literacy is treated as a public policy issue, critical cultural matter, 'McLuhanesque speculation' or as subject of research from psychological or anthropological tradition. We can be focused also on a particular country or culture, particular media, contents and ideologies, audiences or we refer to studies of textual interpretations.

We go from the fact that the listed approaches and from them evolving definitions, are appointed complex and multifaceted – no matter of different perspectives or the standpoints, we speak about the validity of all conceptualizations, hence we just list them and not value them in this article. In all pedagogical concepts matching dimensions reappear, which swing between possible universal descriptions and specific centers. This is followed by the fact that we deal with media literacy: as a common 'adapting to the environment', defined as informed, active and critical understanding of the nature, purpose and influence of media environment and related competences. On a conceptual level we agree with the most used definition, which focuses on the individual, expressed from the side of 'National Leadership Conference on Media Literacy' in the beginning of the nineties, namely, that media literacy is "the ability to access, analyze, evaluate and communicate messages in a variety of forms" (Aufderheide, 1992), which presents an all-embracing framework of competences. The above essential and basic definition is consistent with key theoretical definitions; it reflects the challenging competencies demanded of an individual. Because of a rather simple, but still wide definition, it could be a starting point for the definition of media environment, media divide and lastly of a media literate individual.

OBSTACLE BY THE DEVELOPMENT – SO CALLED 'MEDIA DIVIDE'

Today media literacy is not a luxury but a necessity and we cannot overlook the fact that the level of media literacy of an individual can also change, and that he is going through a dynamic and long term process of learning, but never fully mastering the skill, especially taking into consideration that general literacy is also a "lasting developing capability of individuals" (Ministrstvo za šolstvo in šport, 2005: 6). So to say, media literacy is not a perfected state, as it is a process, which never ends and is constantly changing – it is "continuum and not a category" (Potter, 2013: 25). It is expected from us, that we are media literate, which needs to continually develop, actualize and widen, especially because the field of media technology is evolving at a fast pace. We assume that for many it is difficult to keep up with the changes, although we all have a certain level of media literacy and we cannot say that somebody is completely media literate, as well as, that somebody is completely illiterate (Christ and Potter, 1998). Even so, 'black and white' division on media literate and illiterate is present.

In principle it goes about the so called idea of 'media binomial', which we derive from political binomial after Machiavelli, meaning that there exist 'active minorities and passive majority or the ruling and those who are ruled' - figuratively media literate and those who are not. Polarization between "the media 'haves' and 'have nots'" (Buckingham, 2005:

33), or those who are aware and on the other side those who are ignorant (Wakounig, 2000). Researchers of public opinion distinguish between attentive and inattentive public, which (do not) show interest for public matters, as we can also with media literacy. There are differences between those individuals who can comprehend, critically analyze and evaluate the value of media contents and on the base of qualitative information participate in society, and those, who do not have all this or are not able to (Masterman, in Erjavec, 1999: 55).

“The world economy, due to the digitalization in the middle of an upheaval, is forcing millions of people into a new communication culture – those who cannot keep up are at risk of slipping into lower third of two-thirds of society” (Glutz, 2001: 17), while Alexander Fedorov continues: “I see media illiteracy main danger in the possibility of a person becoming an easy object for all sorts of manipulation on the part of the media or becoming a media addict, consuming all media products without discrimination” (Fedorov, 2008: 14). Peter Glutz talks in his article about media illiteracy as a way of disuse of contemporary media communication means, the second about the consequences of media illiteracy regardless of its origin.

Unfortunately, in the frame of media literacy (as in many other frames), we cannot talk about egalitarian society, which assumes full equality of individuals, since this is a merely a utopian notion. We never managed to create an egalitarian society, where all individuals would be equal – it is the same in the context of media literacy, and consequently we talk of “media divide”. It is an upgrade of the so called ‘digital divide’, because with media literacy we do not refer so much on the social frame, which includes the (in)access to media and technologies, and its (dis)use; but on the lack of cognitive resources that represent competencies that individuals need in the media world. We are talking about the segment of individual competencies and needed skills for their critical use, respectively about communication capabilities (Vehovar and Vukčević, 2001). This is followed by the barriers to media literacy, primarily conceptualized as (1) access barriers, followed by (2) the barriers of use, and (3) barriers of understanding. The latter is like critical media monitoring, knowledge and attitude, the ones most frequently acknowledged in media divide.

Similarly, Sonia Livingstone and Magdalena Bober write about divide based on “quality of use”, when individuals are divided on those to whom the media are increasingly important, rich, diverse, participative and encouraging, and to those, who look on media narrowly, as uninterested and useless (Livingstone and Bober, 2005).

Specific view, thought on digital divide has also Norton (in Vehovar and Vukčević, 2001), as to him it means predominantly difference in a state of society in the information era, according to the state of society in past times. If transferred on media divide – difference of society is nowadays substantial, considering that in the past, individuals were not media literate or not in that sense as today.

So we have (1) media divide between literate and illiterate individuals nowadays, (2) media divide between today and past societies, and (3) assumed divide or divergence

between those who are a part in formal media education and those who are not. Namely media literacy means for an individual an understanding of media and the ability to use it reflectively, critically, independent and judged on a situational basis. But to what extent media education actually adds to increased media literacy, to critical thinking and one's own media creation; and how are this knowledge's and skills consequence of other influences, such as a media society on its own, general intelligence and knowledgeableness, or one's own motivation in the sense of interest and engagement with media? That is why the questions whether media literacy is a result of education or it is a part of general knowledgeableness, mediatization of life, media interaction, perhaps even of media influences, are very well-placed. To this dilemma about clarity of source of an individual's knowledge, new media contribute most. Not only, that new media are informal educators, but in a flood of media contents and information, individuals do not know anymore, where they came across information, and there is an emerging question whether this is part of a direct experience or a media experience. Or as Michael Hoechsmann and Stuart Poyntz states: "[...] there is an increasingly fuzzy line that divides what one knows from where one has learned it, or what one has experienced from where it actually happened" (Hoechsmann and Poyntz, 2012: 17).

DIVIDE BETWEEN FORMAL MEDIA EDUCATION AND ...

Insight into of research on spreading of media knowledge, which concentrate either on a certain theme, level of individual's interaction or age shows some generally expected results – individuals, who are a part of the formal media education, are more media literate. Se-Hoon Jeong (Jeong et al., 2012) says that the assumptions are confirmed, such as: increased knowledge about the media, criticality and awareness of the media effect, harmful or inappropriate behavior, and self-confidence or self-efficiency of the individuals. Similarly also Mary-Lou Galician when she says, that individuals without media education, are poorly equipped for researching and evaluating mediatization: "We do not expect children or adults to be able to learn to read on their own, but most people naively expect that they should be able to read the varied and complicated texts of media – not only newspapers, magazines, and books but also popular songs, radio and television, movies, music videos, and the Internet – without any formal instruction" (Galician, 2004: 9).

On the other hand, experts write that media literacy is being learned mostly unconsciously. José Manuel Perez Tornero and Tapio Varis (Perez Tornero and Varis, 2010) see the gaining of media literacy or 'media awareness' mainly as informal learning, without direct pedagogical discourse or influence. Therefore the unconscious acquisition of media competences within unprogrammed learning. In informal situations are so curriculum, including goals, program of activities and significant learning materials, secondary and in the background or are 'happening invisibly'. As they said "they are implicit in that no one seems to have established them explicitly." (Perez Tornero and Varis, 2010: 87) They are set by the habits and routines, and are not some 'hidden decisions' and that media use and their inclusion in the everyday life within social, technological and media context, encourage, if not even impose such 'indirect curriculum'. "We learn the current uses and

forget the past ones; we recognize the genres, kinds of messages, codes on which they are based; we distinguish between valid sources, the ones that can be motivators; and we ignore the discredited sources. And all of this happens spontaneously". Generally speaking - we learn without formal educational mediation. "That is, they learn without an explicit curriculum, in a practical, inductive way, by themselves, noting their own mistakes and perhaps using their peers as consultants or imitating others' behaviors. [...] Everything happens as a spontaneous, natural phenomenon and it is in that there is no explicit curriculum" (Perez Tornero and Varis, 2010: 87).

We stem from the idea that we do not become media literate just through education institutions, but also independently, as part of today's 'general' literacy where individuals have to be self-responsible for 'good' attitude to media; where "media literacy becomes part of a strategy of creating well-behaved, self-regulating citizen-consumers [...] it reflects a shift from public regulation to individual self-regulation [...] a move away from protectionism and towards empowerment [...] an individualizing move, based on a view of media literacy as a personal attribute, rather than as a social practice" (Buckingham in Verniers, 2009: 16). This supports the above paradigm, followed by presumption, (1) that even without 'intentional' education or learning, we can develop a certain level of media literacy, and (2), that it probably won't reach such high level as by formal learning, therefore the idea of so called the third stage media divide is well-placed. Namely for the formal influencing on individuals media knowledge and skills, it is not necessary to affect on possessing a higher level of media literacy - "acquiring knowledge or skills by itself will not indicate media literacy. The person must actively and mindfully use the information in those knowledge structures during exposures to media messages" (Potter, 2004: 61). Similarly Austin (in Martens, 2010: 13): "an increase in relevant knowledge, may not always predict changes in attitudes and behavior", and continues "the importance of media literacy programs is to include a motivational component so that young people not only understand the concepts of media literacy, but also have the motivation to apply this knowledge".

Jeong writes "the results indicate that media literacy interventions have differential effects on the two types of outcomes: media-relevant outcomes (e.g., knowledge and realism) and behavior-relevant outcomes (e.g., attitudes and behaviors)" (Jeong et al., 2012) The first effect is shown above through the idea of Potter and Austin, but the other is a greater mystery, because it is more difficult to verify if the relationship to the media, which is gained through media education, is used in daily media practice. It is easier to change the level or degree of media knowledge of individuals, rather than changing their attitude to the actual use of media. With this Potter points out, that the problem is more on the use of knowledge rather than knowledge itself - "The problem rests less with awareness and more with acting on those perspectives" (Potter, 2004a: 268). He looks on the media literacy or on the relationship between individuals and the media, from the cognitive point of view, and highlights: "Too often, scholars writing about media literacy have assumed that increasing a person's awareness about particular media messages or about the media industries in general will stimulate a higher level of media literacy. But there is much more to it than that. It is likely that people already know many of the things

that media literacy practitioners want to teach. People might not know all the details or examples, but they do know more than they are often given credit for, even children". And continues: "there is little evidence that changes in public policy or educational institutions will bring about significant and lasting improvement in the public's level of media literacy. Furthermore, there is little evidence thus far that individual interventions by parents or researchers produce lasting changes in a person's media literacy" (Potter, 2004a: 269).

It is difficult to distinguish between competences and their actualization, because individuals may have a high degree of media literacy, but do not use it in everyday life. We could use the phrase – one is theory, the other is practice. An individual can gain a lot of media knowledge through media education, could think critically, but does not retrieve these skills in the media use. One's perception of what media literacy is, is complete and sufficient (or contrary), but one's use of media literacy, is not necessarily proportional to that.

Nevertheless, we originate from the fact, that inequalities in the level of media knowledge and power or media divide, which can be characterized as a new social inequality or even exclusion; can be overcome by media education, which at least on the discursive level, resolves differences within society. The assumption on which we rely, though ironically, on the other hand the very same media education is the one which creates differences between the media's double layered society. We can ask similar question for the media – do they reduce existing media-literate divisions in society, or do they deepen them? Namely there is a danger, that the expansion and development of media technologies deepens the media divide, although Vasja Vehovar and Katja Vukčević claim, that the divide should narrow on its own, when development of technology reaches a certain percentage (Vehovar and Vukčević, 2001: 4). Technically that might be true, but from literacy and learning perspective, the divide is growing or will not be reduced as media literate people learn faster than illiterate.

NEW MEDIA: DOES THE CONCEPT OF MEDIA DIVIDE CHANGES WITH THEIR USE

In a positivist view, now, in 21st century, when the most of the population is literate in a classical sense and when we are more and more aware of influences and the significance of modern technologies; we can no longer place the blame for media illiteracy on to media. New media, which are not purely oriented on the consumer market and enable the possibility of a two way communication, have revitalized the idea of active media participation of individuals, with the introduction of a 'participating media' concept. We have seen the evolution from one-way media to mass media and then further on from mass media we now have the emergence of active 'alternative' media, which are based on the "do it yourself" principle. But on the other hand, the development of media technology, convergence, emergence of new media, improvement in media access and use, and even changed influence and effect – narrowed the rise of media and changed social practices; contribute to the reduction of a critical attitude towards media. It does not necessarily mean that if youths have a familiar and expert relationship with the media,

that simultaneously their critical view of the media will also evolve. Maybe an individual can know how to upload a video, however he would be unable to read a news story with a critical mind. Or considering that media literacy can be viewed as an individual's own attitude with the media - for someone mass media or a specific media can be a rich, useful and interesting source of content, yet for others with a more uninterested attitude, the media can occasionally be useful and have no bigger meaning for an individual. As a result, we presume that one's media literacy depends on how much the media mean to one. As David Buckingham states (Buckingham, 2005: 31): "For example, some individuals may be highly literate on one medium - perhaps as a result of greater experience - but much less literate in others", he continues "Does a media-saturated society necessarily require individuals who are competent to a given level in all media? Indeed, should individuals be expected to develop particular forms of media literacy even if they have no need or wish to do so?" All in all, some individuals, based on their interests do not feel the 'need' for developing media literacy.

Consequently, some critics are raising the negative side of medialisisation and talk of its negative consequences, and on the other side supporters talk of 'social-media positivism' or the so called positive media impact on society. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the media often better control people than people control media. But a return back to the world of non-media is impossible; the self-determination, competence, creativity, activity and social-responsible attitude to the media, are an essential part of effort to education and personal-social growth.

The purpose and goal of why it is essential that we are media literate is clear - to gain control over the exposure or access and to create our own critical view of media messages. If we monitor our media usage, we avoid the potential of media controlling us, or as Potter said: "It is worthwhile that we are media literate" (Potter, 2004: 62) and it is from here, that the relevance of the issue is increasingly important, so that individuals would use media selectively and in the frame of their own interest. People have though accepted the idea of media literacy as a way of improving the quality of life, however ironically media literacy and media education have not become an essential part of everyday life and discourse. Namely (media) literacy is neither an inborn pattern, nor the necessity of psychological development, but depends on the requirements of educational institutions, parents and the wider media society. It has to be learned and taught.

In order to understand the meaning of media, we develop media competences and these are at various stages and are multi-dimensional, therefore media literacy differs especially between children or adolescents and adults. Namely young people live "with media and in the media", as Bernd Schorb says (Schorb, 1995), since they are not a stimulus, acting on them from the outside, but are part of their social world. It is not an exaggeration, if we claim that only those who think and behave media literally, could safely move and assert themselves in new media worlds; therefore, the perception of media literacy meaning must expand. According to Bergmanns definition (in Sprick, 2007: 73), media literacy is like "a building block to education", that must be provided, so that young individuals can develop self-esteem and values, discover and test something new, learn to

respect and also coping with uncertainties. This view is affirmed by many other authors, which could be summed up in thought of Zala Volčič, when she said, that “every individual should have media literacy skills and everybody should learn it” (Volčič, 2011).

This does not mean that the media divide will in the future no longer exist, because we distinguish the fact of his existence and the question of his increase. Certain divide exists in all societies regardless of whether we follow the normalization hypothesis, which says that the gap will eventually close or the stratification model, which assumes a further divide, or even the diffusion theory, which says, that the economic benefits of elites will even deepen (Norris in Vehovar and Vukčević, 2001: 20). Marshall McLuhan once said that every new technology requires a war. Perhaps we did not understand this for a long, but now we can see, that the transformed hypothesis of a “black sheep” on the media illiterate, the exclusion of individuals from the media and its content, as well as pointing the finger at the so called “media homeless”, i.e. those who do not use the media or those with a low level of media knowledge; can lead to a ‘war’ between the media-literate and illiterate. With this, the divide between those who know, can and have and those who do not know, cannot and do not have it, grows (Kovačič, 2006), as society is splitting on two uneven camps, leading to the question of the legitimacy of media-social differences.

THE PROGRESS OF MEDIA LITERACY

There is a similar divide between traditional concepts of media literacy and derivations of new epistemological alternatives or interpretations that are constantly evolving - firstly, technology is evolving and so are the media, because of the mediation of society, changes in our perception, evolving ways of communication and overall because we are in a process of “medialen wandel” (Groeben, 2002: 13). Due to evolving media and society the concept of media literacy is increasingly complex. Modern society has, as already mentioned, moved from an era of linguistic literacy to information and media literacy, where it is not enough to be able to read printed text, but also to be able to critically interpret images in the multimedia culture, and to express oneself through different media forms (Mikulič, 2008). We have grown in understanding how mass media work and how people accept media contents (Thoman, 1990), and consequently the definition of literacy has evolved from relative simple meaning of the ability to read and write to the capability for more in-depth understanding – to the taxonomically higher rank of ability, critical attitude enhanced with individual creativity.

Hence it was necessary to widen the term and meaning of media literacy and it will surely need further evolution as time passes, unless we replace it with a pallet of more exact interpretations (Rot Gabrovec, 2010). Namely we could assume that the media literacy represents a short-term actuality, which will demand from us even more, while the definition of it in the sense of competences that are required, fields and questions which are defining it it, will continually require additions and changes. All scientific disciplines are actually subject to continued change, because they respond to changes in their thematic area, likewise are changing the methods. In communication science this is shown

for instance as a change of self-understanding from newspaper science in the first half of the 20th century, to science of media culture and society today. Following, basic and key definition of media literacy, which, repeated, encompass “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate and communicate messages in a variety of forms” (Aufderheide, 1992), will in the future therefore also be insufficient, to unspecific and inadequate.

Directly also media education needs to be oriented towards the future and capture today's assumptions and developments, which is challenging, as defining the needs of media literacy in the future is not straight forward due to the unpredictable changes. Latest is hard to define, because we do not know what kind of media literacy will be needed. This creates a challenge for media educational approach, which in this time of constant change, technological evolution and convergence, has to cope with the knowledge that the components of media literacy are not final. We need to focus on the question over the essential components and qualifications that are key for an individual to function media literate (Wakounig, 2000). As a result, the definition of media literacy is not only subject to technological change, but also the subject of current interests, social needs, values and cognitive abilities.

CONCLUSION

Above we pointed out the epistemological conflict of descriptive theories of media literacy. Why descriptive – because we cannot claim, that they are permanent, because they are changing and evolving in line with society and media technologies, demanding further developments. As the term requires constant evolution so as an individual's level of media literacy, however, that is never fully achieved as there is no such thing as complete and absolute media literacy – as there is no complete definition of the term itself. From this we can deduce that all the definitions of media literacy are in the transitional phase, which is necessary for the development of advanced theories. That the theories of media literacy are in an area of morphology is not a bad thing, it only means, that they are interconnecting, complementing and building themselves up. Absolute definition is almost impossible to achieve.

It is similar with the media divide and attempts to bridge it, either in the frame of formal media education or through everyday learning. The divide exist and will continue existing – more media, more contents, more options, bigger influence, bigger media society, bigger divide and a greater need for media literacy as well as contemporary media education.

It is impossible to reflect all media changes that are taking place in all areas of media literacy, as well as questioning why it is important to be media literate. It is only necessary to expand our skills, but not forget the old ones - so that we become active creators of media contents, images and products. As Henry Jenkins writes, an individual “[...] determines what, when, and how he watches media. He is a media consumer, perhaps even a media fan, but he is also a media producer, distributor, publicist, and critic” (Jenkins, 2006: 135). Recently media producer and media consumer are becoming one, as the user

is increasingly taking hold of the technology and is coming in contact with social processes of use, production and potential creation of media content. "For the first time in the history, people's minds are becoming a production force and not only a part of the production system" (Pivec, 2004: 27).

Media literacy if unused is incomplete and only active use of media leads to the evolution of a confident and autonomic relationship with the media and consequently to the critical distance towards media construction. Individual media experience and media production are essential for the understanding of the media work and the reflection on its products and messages. This is why a contemporary media literacy has to incorporate all past approaches and knowledge of media literacy coupled with an active participation and use of media. With the emergence of accessible and easy-to-use media production technology and increasing media literacy there is a big potential to try and bridge the media divide. But as we are increasingly closer to media creation itself, are we really able to create communication and media environment with no media divides? And we ask us again like in the introduction: Is this just a utopian idea or potentially plausible?

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MEDIJSKA PISMENOST U VRIJEME MEDIJSKOG JAZA

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SAŽETAK *Živimo u postmodernom društvu, društvu znanja i participacije, u informacijskom društvu, a ponajprije u medijskom društvu. U takvom društvu, u kojem mediji zauzimaju dominantan položaj, nužno je zahtijevati razvoj „tradicionalnog“ koncepta medijske pismenosti te ne ispuštati iz fokusa problem medijskog jaza (engl. media divide). Dva su razloga za to. Prvo, nalazimo se u dobu tehnološke revolucije i vrijeme je da razmislimo o značenju i funkcijama medija te o tome kako svakodnevno doživljavamo medije. Društvo se mora postaviti kao subjekt u odnosu s nametljivim medijima. Potrebno je naučiti kako se mediji mogu upotrijebiti za vlastitu korist i razvoj kreativnosti te ujedno biti kritičan i autonoman prema odabranom medijskom sadržaju. Drugo, kako je razvoj medija uvjetovan stalnim tehnološkim promjenama koje dovode do konvergencije, pojedinačno razumijevanje medija također se mora mijenjati tijekom vremena. U svrhu unapređenja individualnog shvaćanja medija pojedinac mora postati aktivan sudionik, a ne ostati pasivan potrošač medijskog sadržaja. Jedino na taj način možemo nadvladati medijsku podjelu između medijski pismenih i nepismenih pojedinaca te pretpostavljenu podjelu na one koji imaju formalno medijsko obrazovanje nasuprot onih koji ga nemaju.*

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

MEDIJSKA PISMENOST, MEDIJSKO OBRAZOVANJE, MEDIJSKI JAZ

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DRUŠTVENE

MREŽE I POLITIČKA

KOMUNIKACIJA

SOCIAL NETWORKS

AND POLITICAL

COMMUNICATION

INFORMACIJSKA TEHNOLOGIJA I NOVINARSTVO (ITN) – 18 GODINA POSLIJE

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Sigurno ima onih koji vole i žele sve kvantificirati – oni vjerojatno očekuju da je ovaj tekst prepun tablica i grafikona iz kojih bi (ako imaju dovoljno strpljenja, volje i znatiželje) saznali koliki je postotak izlaganja koja je priredilo dvoje ili troje autora, iz koje je zemlje (naravno nakon Hrvatske) bilo najviše sudionika, koje su teme bile najzastupljenije, koliko minuta, redaka, slajdova je u prosjeku imalo pojedino izlaganje, i tako dalje, i tako dalje. Analizirani bi bili i paneli (pozvana izlaganja, broj diskutiranja i sl.), a možda i gdje smo i kada organizirali zajedničku večeru ili izlet...

No, to mi nije namjera, a zapravo mi je za gotovo većinu podataka koje bi dala takva analiza i potpuno svejedno.

Dubrovačke konferencije (kao i tečajevi, pa i radionice koje su bile njihov sastavni dio) ipak su nešto drugo od nizanja podataka. Iako je ova, 2013. godina proglašena godinom „velikih podataka“ (*big data*), bit ću tako slobodan da ne budem u trendu, neću vizualizirati, zanemarit ću mogućnost konstrukcije infografike, odoljet ću sirenskom zovu slaganja vremenske crte (*timeline*) gdje bi se lijepo poredani nalazili svi važniji događaji iz povijesti konferencije Informacijska tehnologija i novinarstvo (iako, nikad se ne zna...) te ću pokušati napisati tekst u nadi da to još uvijek nije potpuno zaboravljeni oblik komuniciranja.

Konferencija Informacijska tehnologija i novinarstvo (konačno) je odrasla, proteklog je ljeta postala punoljetna!

Ta činjenica baš nikome, osim roditeljima, ništa ne znači; uostalom, ako je porod bio (relativno) težak, djetinjstvo je bilo onakvo kakvo i treba biti: mnogo znatiželje, malo lutanja, ponešto igre, puno učenja. Pubertet nas je ipak malo namučio – odjednom je tema kojom smo se dugo vremena jedini u zemlji bavili postala vrlo „in“: gotovo svaki mjesec netko je organizirao i pozivao na slične skupove i rasprave, tematski brojevi (znanstvenih, ali i popularnih) časopisa natjecali su se u objavljivanju radova o novim medijima, teme *online* novinarstva i uopće korištenja informacijskih tehnologija u novinarstvu, odnosno u medijima, odjednom su se našle u nastavnim planovima i programima, pojavili su se i specijalistički studiji na tu temu. Više nismo bili sami; s jedne strane, bilo je mnogo jednostavnije opisivati predmet interesa konferencija, ali se istovremeno pojavila konkurencija, a malo je onih koji mogu sudjelovati na više skupova tijekom jedne godine. No ipak, ITN je bio i ostao drukčiji, nikada nije težio masovnosti – pa je stoga uvijek bilo vremena za raspravu; podjednaka je pozornost posvećivana najistaknutijim imenima svjetske i domaće znanosti, kao i studentima poslijediplomskih studija ili medijskim djelatnicima koji inače ne dolaze na znanstvene konferencije. Upravo su na tom skupu svoju premijeru doživjela prva *online* izdanja u Hrvatskoj (npr. *Glas Istre* 1997.), tu smo imali priliku vidjeti beta-verzije *Vjesnika* i *Slobodne Dalmacije*, HINA je prezentirala svoj informacijski sustav, a pratili smo i različite pristupe u obradi (*Vjesnikove*) novinske dokumentacije. Već 2001. godine otvorili smo temu slobode na internetu, a godinu ili dvije poslije raspravljali smo o utjecaju novih medija na odnose s javnošću i na javnu diplomaciju.

Uostalom, evo i popisa nekih tema koje su našle svoje mjesto na konferencijama tijekom proteklih desetak godina:

treba li i zašto uložiti ljudske i financijske resurse u *online* izdanje / kako stjecati prihode od *online* izdanja (oglasi, pretplate, plaćanje „po pogledu“, sadržaji „na zahtjev“ itd.) / koji su modeli proizvodnje i uređivanja sadržaja najprimjereniji za pojedine platforme / kriza tiskanih medija / kakvo obrazovanje za digitalno novinarstvo / tehnike i alati digitalnog novinarstva / integritet sadržaja i pohrana digitalnih publikacija / digitalizacija (novinske) dokumentacije / blogovi i građansko novinarstvo / digitalne enciklopedije danas i ovdje / informacijsko društvo i informacijska ekonomija / etika digitalnih medija / autorska prava na *webu* / mreža i sloboda informacija / e-udžbenici i e-nakladništvo / e-učenje / kultura interneta / *web* i istraživačko novinarstvo / strategija informatizacije Hrvatske / odnosi s javnošću i informacijske tehnologije / novi mediji i „revolucije“ u pojedinim zemljama / što je WikiLeaks promijenio u razumijevanju komunikacijskih procesa u svijetu / ACTA, PIPA, SOPA, CISPA / globalizacija i medijska industrija / digitalni (informacijski) jaz / e-vlada i e-demokracija / informacijske tehnologije i javna diplomacija / digitalna pismenost / društveno odgovorno ponašanje kompanija / elektronički identitet / informacijska/medijska ekologija.

Što smo sve naučili na konferencijama?

Sloboda interneta (ili slobodna „proizvodnja informacija“, njihova komunikacija i korištenje na internetu) jest sigurno jedan od pojmova koji se najviše spominjao posljednjih godina (ne samo na Googleovu pretraživaču). Riječ je o temi koju gotovo svatko promatra iz drugog kuta. U posljednje vrijeme posebno se ističe problem temeljnih ljudskih prava, što sigurno uključuje privatnost, izostanak bilo kakve kontrole od strane trećih (bilo vlada i ostalih „državnih“ tijela, legalnih ili tajnih, bilo ogromnog broja tvrtki koje su na različite načine došle do podataka o tome kako živimo i radimo, odnosno što želimo, pa nam u tome namjeravaju „pomoći“...), nepovredivost razmjene ideja, stavova i ostalih oblika izražavanja koji su namijenjeni unaprijed određenim primateljima, a ne svekolikoj javnosti. Čak i ako mislimo da smo neke podatke uništili, izbrisali, već će se pronaći načini da se i to pročita, odnosno pregleda bez našeg znanja i, naravno, suprotno našoj volji. Takozvani „digitalni zaborav“, preporuka o pravu svake osobe da ona sama, svojevrijedno u potpunosti može nepovratno uništiti sve informacije koje je sama stavila na mrežu (najčešće na neku od društvenih mreža), uključujući i one koje je o njoj netko drugi stavio, još uvijek je samo skup načela na papiru (ili nekom drugom nositelju sadržaja...), a praksa je, naravno, drukčija. Paradoks je u tome da neke države vrlo efikasno mijenjaju zabilježenu prošlost i/ili sadašnjost bez obzira na to na kojem su mediju bile zabilježene (jedan od novijih primjera pratili smo u Sjevernoj Koreji), a oni koji bi po svim ljudskim i inim zakonima trebali biti vlasnici „svojih“ informacija to nikako ne uspijevaju.

Sve je više onih koji privatnost promatraju kao pravo na osobnost i život kojim možemo sami upravljati, samostalno donoseći odluke o tome što, kada i kako želimo podijeliti s drugima, a nitko ne bi trebao imati pravo (ili bolje rečeno mogućnost) da bez naše suglasnosti s bilo kojom izlikom koristi podatke koje je sakupio i pohranio (bez našeg znanja) u cilju promicanja interesa koji nemaju veze ni s načinom kako je do tih podataka došao,

a još manje s našim viđenjem sebe i svoje misije u svijetu u kojem živimo. Privatnost je u svakom slučaju preduvjet slobode mišljenja i izražavanja, pa ako postoji i najmanja vjerojatnost da određeni režim ili samo neki njegovi dijelovi (uz znanje ili bez znanja vrha vlade) sustavno narušavaju ne samo naša prava već prvenstveno našu slobodu, jasno je da živimo u neslobodnom društvu.

Društvene mreže ili društveni mediji (kako ih ponekad nazivamo) od samog nastanka (a to je bilo – iako će to rijetko tko povjеровати – tek prije desetak godina) neprestano su u središtu pozornosti sudionika konferencija. Dugo ih nitko nije shvaćao previše ozbiljno – novi oblik druženja, mogućnost da ponovo sretnemo davno izgubljene ili zaboravljene prijatelje, trenutačno slanje informacija na veliki broj adresa (onima za koje pretpostavljamo da bi ih te informacije mogle zanimati), i to je bilo uglavnom sve. Facebook je dugo bio samo potencijal, a bilo je malo onih koji su gledali dovoljno daleko u budućnost da ostvare sve mogućnosti koje su se počele pojavljivati. To me podsjetilo na onu čuvenu rečenicu kojom je De Gaulle svojedobno komentirao najveću zemlju Južne Amerike: „Brazil je zemlja budućnosti i uvijek će ostati takva...“ No, Facebook ipak nije dugo čekao na ostvarenje svoje budućnosti, barem kada je riječ o broju korisnika i neprestanom rastu prihoda. Sinergija milijarde korisnika, sofisticiranih načina praćenja potreba, snage osobne (prijateljske) preporuke dovela je do stvaranja mreže unutar mreže, pa iako je za sada težište razvoja (čitaj: stjecanje prihoda) stavljeno na marketing i trgovinu, nešto političke akcije i ponekad malo (pop-)kulture, utjecaj na „digitalne urođenike“ ogroman je i nitko ne može dati suvislu procjenu posljedica tog utjecaja na kulturu i obrazovanje, rad i način života generacija koje dolaze.

Na ovom mjestu neću otvarati druge teme o kojima je bilo rasprave, a još manje bih komentirao tekstove koje objavljujemo u ovom broju – oni su dovoljno reprezentativni i govore za sebe – te samo pozivam na čitanje i razmišljanje o temama koje otvaraju. Nećemo se zadržavati ni na nagradama/priznanjima koje smo dodjeljivali najboljim *online* novinarima u zemlji ili posebnim sjednicama posvećenim obljetnicama Bože Težaka (pionira informacijskih znanosti u Hrvatskoj) te Roberta M. Hayesa (čovjeka koji je prije šezdesetak godina skovao termin *information science*).

Na kraju još samo želim spomenuti da su direktori ITN-a u ovih 18 godina bili: Nenad Prelog (Sveučilište u Zagrebu), Robert M. Hayes (University of California, Los Angeles), Pavao Novosel (Sveučilište u Zagrebu), Steven S. Ross (Columbia University, New York), Sherry Ricchiardi (Indiana University, Indianapolis), Damir Boras (Sveučilište u Zagrebu) i Inoslav Bešker (University of Bologna). Članovi Organizacijskog odbora bili su: Domagoj Bebić (Fakultet političkih znanosti), Zoran Bekić (Sveučilišni računski centar), Mario Bošnjak (Hrvatsko novinarsko društvo), Branko Hebrang (HINA), Predrag Pale (Ministarstvo znanosti i tehnologije), Goran Radman (Microsoft Hrvatska), Josip Stipanov (Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica) i Jasenka Zajec (Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica).*

Možda ipak još vrijedi reći da ono što ne smijemo zaboraviti jesu i druženja, kako za vrijeme konferencija tako i poslije njih; svi će reći samo: bilo je neponovljivo!

*Navedene su organizacije u kojima su radili u doba dok su bili članovi Organizacijskog odbora.

NEW MEDIA AND THE CROWDSOURCING OF POLITICS: THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. BERLUSCONI AND MR. GRILLO

Inoslav Bešker

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ABSTRACT *The main Italian populist politicians, Silvio Berlusconi and Beppe Grillo, ensured their successes in parliamentary elections in 2013 combining a skilful use of electronic media with classical mass rallies, avoiding debates with competitors, and shunning journalists. The message of both Grillo and Berlusconi is characterized by populism, anti-party attitudes, demonization of opponents and an approach to the public and to politics focused on the leader. Although Grillo and Casaleggio emphasize their Movement's use of Internet as a direct democracy, claiming that the Movement's politics is created in equal measure by all the members, in a kind of a crowdsourcing, Grillo's messages remain mostly unidirectional directives, more appropriate to a dictatorial than to a democratic discourse.*

KEY WORDS

NEW MEDIA, POLITICS, CROWDSOURCING, POPULISM, ITALY, GRILLO, BERLUSCONI

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... *Who is to be blamed? Them! The parties! For 13 years they have shown what they are capable of. We have a nation economically devastated, farmers ruined, the middle class is on its knees, finances exhausted, and millions of unemployed ... They are responsible! ...*

They constantly try to confuse me with them ... Today they say I am a socialist, tomorrow a communist, then a trade unionist; they confuse us because they think we are like them. We are not like them! They are dead and we want to see them all in the grave! ...

*They suggested I should enter a coalition. That's how they think! They still do not understand that they are dealing with a movement that is quite different from the political parties. ... We will resist any pressure. This is a movement that is impossible to stop. They do not understand that this movement holds together a force that cannot be destroyed. We are not a party, we represent all the people. New people.*¹

The practice of going into politics and of leading a political party, yet bypassing parliament and using either classical or new media instead, was started in Italy by successful politicians such as Silvio Berlusconi² and Beppe Grillo³. It is a characteristic of their relationship to the media that they use media resources as the principal vehicle for their communications not only during campaigns, but also for their contacts with supporters and with their *peones*⁴, even during parliamentary sessions, which Berlusconi⁵ and Grillo⁶ do not attend at all. For his unidirectional directives Berlusconi also uses social networks, mainly Facebook (<https://www.facebook.com/SilvioBerlusconi>).

Two issues are worthy of analysis in this context, one specific and one general. Firstly, what type of policy has proved to be most compatible with the Internet, in Italy, one of the world's leading representative democracies – at least formally – and a member of the G7⁷ since 1975? Secondly, can we consider the massive use of new media for political purposes part of eDemocracy?

¹ This quotation was shown to me alongside some other people in Italy. Almost all of us were convinced that the quotation was from an article or speech by Beppe Grillo. We were wrong: these words were spoken during the 1932 German electoral campaign by Adolf Hitler, the winner of that democratic contest.

² Silvio Berlusconi (born Milan, 29 September 1936) is an Italian politician, entrepreneur, media tycoon and convicted fraudster, who served three times as Prime Minister of Italy, from 1994 to 1995, 2001 to 2006 and 2008 to 2011. Berlusconi is also the controlling shareholder of *Mediaset* and owner of the Italian football club A.C. Milan. He is the unelected, undisputed leader of the *Popolo della libertà* (People of Freedom), a centre-right party he founded in 2009 as a successor to the *Forza Italia* party he had led since 1993. On 11 March 2013, *Forbes* magazine ranked him as the 194th richest man in the world with a net worth of US\$6.2 billion. Milan prosecutors stated that Mr. Berlusconi 'hosted a prostitution system' in his residences, as a centrepiece of his widely known '*bunga bunga*' parties.

³ Giuseppe Piero 'Beppe' Grillo (born Genoa, 21 July 1948) is an Italian comedian, actor, blogger and political activist. On 8 September 2007 Grillo organized a 'V-Day Celebration' in Italy; the 'V' stood for *vaffanculo* (fuck off), directed at all other political parties and leaders. He founded the Five Star Movement in 2009 and remains its unelected, undisputed leader, but does not hold any public office. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in 1981.

⁴ "Peones" are less influential members of Parliament who form the 'voting machines' in the chambers, and in the committees and commissions.

⁵ Berlusconi was elected to the Italian Senate, but he attended only a single session before he was sentenced to four years in prison, which meant his automatic expulsion from Parliament.

⁶ Grillo did not run for Parliament because his conviction for involuntary manslaughter (he caused the death of a person in a car accident) made him ineligible.

⁷ Originally the seven most industrialised nations, and still the seven most industrialised fully democratic nations, with a combined GDP of over half nominal global GDP.

POPULISM TAILORED FOR THE MEDIA

In considering the policies of Berlusconi and Grillo – extremely hostile towards each other – there is no doubt that their success in the 2013 parliamentary elections in Italy⁸, is owed predominantly to skilful use of electronic media.

Berlusconi, a seasoned TV tycoon⁹, highly skilled in televisual counter-attacks, used his appearances on television to maximum effect. He returned from the brink, to become once again the dominant figure on the Italian institutional political scene.

Grillo, a comedian fired from generalist television channels for his irreverent invectives against the institutional politicians, used his blog (<http://www.beppegrillo.it/>) to achieve his breakthrough in the world of politics, for the formation of his political movement, *MoVimento 5 Stelle* (Five Star MoVement, M5S)¹⁰, and eventually as his main vehicle for electoral propaganda.

The approach of both Grillo and Berlusconi is characterized by populism, anti-party attitudes, demonization of opponents and an approach to the public and to politics focused on the leader. A propensity for jokes and a thorough knowledge of the medium of television seem to be traits common to both gentlemen.

Berlusconi uses his own television channels for communication, even for the messages without any questioning, any discussion, in the manner of a head of State; Grillo uses YouTube as a television channel. Both rely on TV and Internet marketing: Berlusconi on *Publitalia* advertising company, and Grillo on *Casaleggio Associati*, an internet and publishing company specializing in consulting, which advises on network strategies and edits Grillo's blog. Both ask candidates for a CV as part of the recruitment process, as is the custom in enterprises.

During the recruitment of possible representatives (first in marketing, then in politics) Berlusconi and his PR guru Marcello Dell'Utri – the Senator convicted for his role as Berlusconi's link to the Sicilian mafia – introduced databases, updated after each contact, more detailed than in intelligence services. Grillo, on the other hand, uses the social networks even for conducting polls about possible candidates for the post of President of the Republic.

We might say that Berlusconi introduced the "politics of outsourcing", and Grillo the "politics of crowdsourcing". These methods would be impossible without the new media.

⁸ Berlusconi's centre-right coalition earned 29.18% of the vote and now is the largest bloc (only 0.36% less than centre-left *Italia, il bene comune* (Italy: Common Good), since dissolved, and its principal *Partito democratico* (Democratic Party) remains at 25.42%); Grillo's Five Star MoVement got 25.55%, becoming the largest party (but not the largest bloc) in Italy

⁹ Berlusconi owns family holdings Italia I-XVII. They own the *Fininvest* Group, which owns, among other, the *Mediaset* TV group, which in turn owns several generalist television networks: *Canale5*, *Italia Uno*, *Retequattro* which are positioned respectively at 5, 6, and 4 on an Italian remote control - the entire second line of a remote control set for the Italian digital terrestrial network - and more than another dozen Berlusconi-controlled channels can be found on the two-digit and three-digit positions assigned in the network.

¹⁰ The uppercase V denotes the vulgar but extremely common curse *vaffanculo* (fuck off) used by Grillo at rallies as his rebuke to the political parties. He organized the *Vaffa* days throughout Italy, allowing supporters and citizens to participate in the collective rite of cursing politicians.

Both Berlusconi and Grillo are proponents of postmodern populism, where anonymous supporters are tied passively to the personality of the charismatic leader, following his appearances through television broadcasts or Internet streaming; their response limited mostly to commenting online.

Both Berlusconi and Grillo started their public careers as professional entertainers: a long time ago Berlusconi worked on cruisers, as a compere, telling jokes and occasionally singing; Grillo worked as a comedian, satirist and impressionist. Both are rich. Berlusconi was the richest man in Italy for many years, until he distributed part of his capital to his children; he continues to control it. Grillo's wealth is not formally recorded as he holds no public office, but he has never denied the allegations that he owns assets worth more than a billion euros. Both own the name and logo of their movement personally, which is almost unheard of among the large parliamentary parties both in Italy and the rest of the European Union.

Berlusconi and Grillo entered political life with long-held personal positions and ideas, Berlusconi's political philosophy dates from the eighties and Grillo's from the nineties, and he formalized it no later than 2007. Neither Berlusconi nor Grillo showed any professional political vocation in their younger days, but they entered politics when it encroached on their core business. This does not mean that they were uninterested in politics. On the contrary: Grillo was earning his entertainer's salary mocking politicians and their politics, and this is still the main method and content of his political discourse, while Berlusconi on one hand gained favors from politicians by investing in their campaigns and in their friendship (the best man at his second marriage was none other than Prime Minister Bettino Craxi), and on the other joined the secret conspiracy Masonic lodge *Propaganda 2* led by former fascist spy and conspirator Licio Gelli. As Prime Minister he, legitimately, enacted part of *Propaganda 2's* political agenda.

Berlusconi's "model" of acting in public is sometimes known as *cucu* (hide and seek), a term coined by Vladimir Putin. The autocratic Russian leader used the term after Berlusconi, when Italian Prime Minister and host of a G8 conference in Trieste in 2008, surprised and frightened Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor. Berlusconi was hidden behind a monument and jumped out screaming *cucu*. His *modus operandi* is to act the jester in public, buying some sympathy; but as a shark behind the scenes, swallowing everything moving and breathing, from enterprises to prostitutes.

Grillo's "model" of acting in public is somewhat complicated. Grillo does not appear in the media; does not permit any media appearance by members of his Movement; does not respond to reporters' questions – arguing that "almost all journalists are servants of [political] parties" (Grillo, 2008); does not give interviews – except outside Italy – and does not participate in any discussions or debate: he only pontificates. He also holds rallies where he can howl his so called paradoxes, and writes on his blog.

Grillo is straight-talking, on the Internet as well at rallies. The political philosophy he sells sounds very simple: *uno vale uno* ("all citizens are equally valuable") – therefore

anyone can represent the others; Italian politics is corrupt, elitist, and closed; the state is too expensive; money is wasted; money is drained out of Italians' pockets; political parties do not serve politics but enrich their leadership and their clients; parties must be eliminated because they are the source of all evils and because Italians are prone to needless and futile divisions ("One Italian is a Latin lover, two are a mess, three make up four political parties." [Lavanga¹¹, 2013], etc.).

Grillo argues that multiparty representative democracy must be replaced, especially after Berlusconi, who is called *psico nano* (psycho-dwarf) by Mr. Grillo: "Italians need to understand we need to move on from Berlusconi. Berlusconi is just a promise, a marketing exercise, an advertisement. We need to rebuild this country from its roots." (Chatterley and Ransinghe, 2013)

The Five Star Movement ran 2013 on promises to cut the number of parliamentarians¹² in half; reduce their pay; pass an anti-corruption law; create a "citizen's stipend" for unemployed Italians and create incentives – including tax cuts – to help small businesses grow.

Grillo's skill has been to channel a general frustration and convert apathy into anger, using this as the basis for a powerful but unstable political movement. The methodology used by Mr. Grillo was developed some ten years ago (Hooper, 2013), when he met Gianroberto Casaleggio¹³. It is, in a nutshell, direct democracy using the Internet and its interactivity. Casaleggio defines it as "a new, direct democracy that will see the elimination of all barriers between the citizen and the state." (Hooper, 2013) "Without the web, Beppe and I would not have achieved a thing ... It is the web that has altered all the balances." (Hooper, 2013)

POLITICS BETWEEN ESOTERICISM AND FANTASY

Massimo Introvigne, a sociologist specializing in the study of new religions, claims that Casaleggio is a "techno-guru between esotericism and fantasy" (Del Vigo 2012), inspired by the writings of Alexandre Saint-Yves d'Alveydre¹⁴. Giovanni Favia, expelled from the Movement, described him (Serra 2012) as a combination of Marcello Dell'Utri¹⁵ (Berlusconi's organizer) and L. Ron Hubbard (founder of Scientology). Some members of M5S call him "Spectre" (after the mystical opponent of James Bond). Casaleggio claims Genghis Khan as the forerunner of the Internet because of his use of super-fast messengers who travelled from one end of the known world to the other. Casaleggio acts as a prophet: in 2008 he recorded a video *Gaia*¹⁶ (Casaleggio, 2008) in which foretold that newspapers

¹¹ <http://www.aforismario.it/beppe-grillo.htm> (22.08.2013)

¹² In Italy, parliamentarians earn as much as €180.000 (US\$230,000) per year, much higher than the \$174,000 (€135.000) earned by members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

¹³ Gianroberto Casaleggio (born Milan, 14 August 1954) is an Italian entrepreneur and a political opinion maker in Italy. He is co-founder, with Grillo, of the Five Star Movement and is sometimes called a 'guru' of the Movement.

¹⁴ French esoteric lived in the 19th century.

¹⁵ Marcello Dell'Utri (born Palermo, 11 September 1941) is an Italian propagandist, manager and advisor to Berlusconi, a former senator, he did not stand in the 2013 elections because he is a convicted criminal, found guilty of tax fraud, false accounting, and complicity in conspiracy with the Sicilian Mafia (the conviction for the last charge is pending appeal).

¹⁶ Greek goddess Gaea (Latin: Gaea) means: Earth.

would disappear in five years (i.e. 2013), the third World War in 2040 leading to the victory of the West – supported by the Internet – over the East – leaning on brutal power, and in 2054 the appearance of Gaia, with the Earth unified by Internet (was not the concept of the unified life on Earth, under the same name *Gaia*, already found in Asimov, but as one of the obstacles to the development of mankind?). M5S is, for Casaleggio, the first step towards that goal.

Casaleggio's key move was to create *Il Blog di Beppe Grillo*, subtitled *Il primo magazine solo on line* ("the first exclusively online magazine") a claim that was untrue but effective, as are most of Grillo's claims, "justified" by the poetics of the satirical discourse. Grillo's blog is the most widely read in Italy, and as early as in 2007 it became the seventh most popular in the world, in spite of being written in Italian.

Matter of fact, the large number of followers the blog attracted encouraged Casaleggio and Grillo to believe they had enough support to found a political movement, Q. E. D.

That basis became even greater through use of social networking: Grillo has, by an enormous margin, the largest social media following of any politician in the European Union. He has about 1.1million Facebook "likers", and 1.2 million Twitter followers¹⁷. The next most prominent Italian politician on social media is Pier Luigi Bersani, with nearly a quarter of million "likers" and followers; other European politicians with a prominent social media presence include David Cameron.

In Jamie Bartlett's estimation (2013) Grillo

...has around a quarter of a million supporters who consider themselves members of the movement: an army of volunteers and door-knockers that would previously have taken years to recruit. The medium and the message fit hand in glove: the media is a racket, so circumvent it. Politics is closed – especially the party list system – so elect members online.

Grillo's M5S had support of close to 5% nationally as far back as May 2012. Nine months later, in the national parliamentary elections, M5S took 25.5% of the vote¹⁸. This share of the vote was achieved with a "fascinating and powerful mix of anti-establishment rhetoric, new technology and old-fashioned rallies and local action" (Bartlett, 2013). "Head on the internet, and feet on the ground", as Grillo himself puts it (Bartlett, 2013)¹⁹.

The thirteen months preceding these elections was another *annus horribilis* on the Italian public scene: under the government of Mario Monti - hailed in the beginning as the country's savior - industrial production fell by 5.4%, unemployment rose from 8% to 11% and amongst people under 25 years from 30 to 37%. A generation of well-educated young people was left in the "precariat": working in internships, temporary jobs or on short-term contracts; earning no more than €1,000 per month, sometimes less than €500 per month

¹⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/beppegrillo.it> (21.08.2013); https://twitter.com/beppe_grillo (21.08.2013).

¹⁸ If we consider it a protest vote, and if we add the 25 percent non-voters at the same general elections, it seems that half Italy's adult citizens expressed their disgust towards the political parties.

¹⁹ It was an echo of the Microsoft's advertising slogan: "Head in the Cloud, Feet on the Ground", based on Virgil's description of Phéme (Fama, Fame), Gaia's daughter.

and with no prospect of a stable, decently-paid job; without savings; living with parents rather than in their own flat. The number living in poverty rose from 9 to 10 million, i.e. to more than 16% of 61 million inhabitants. Monti's was a government supported by all the three major parties, and therefore without any relevant opposition in the Parliament. Grillo's movement was able to fill the political vacuum, exploiting the frustration, disgust and anger with conventional politics.

It seems obvious that Grillo's success is due to the increasing mistrust of political parties and to the widespread use of the new technologies.

The question is: what is the ratio of those two elements? What is the relative importance of populism – sometimes dangerously close to the national-socialist one – and what is due to cunning exploitation of new media?

eDEMOCRACY OR eDIRECTIVE?

Returning to the question of whether Berlusconi's and Grillo's recent successes can be seen as a triumph of a certain type of the eDemocracy ("direct democracy", according to Casaleggio, 2008) over the slow and abstruse – perhaps even sclerotic – procedures in a classic democracy, the first step should be to reconsider what eDemocracy and eGovernment are today.

According to Meier's (2012: v) Editorial to *eDemocracy & eGovernment* "By means of eDemocracy, it is intended to support the exchange of information, as well as democratic processes of decision making, voting, and elections", these are listed as eAssistance, eProcurement, eService, eContracting, eSettlement, eCollaboration, eDemocracy in the narrow sense (for instance eElection, eVoting). Similarly "eGovernment aims to put digital public services at disposal for citizens, companies, and organizations"; examples include "electronic services in taxation, employment services and online job markets, public offering via Web platforms, or mobile health services" (*ibid.*).

So, there is no mention of any eGuidance by an eLeader.

But should we recognize Grillo's or Berlusconi's use of the media to further their political goals as another manifestation of the "great promise of citizen media - democratized digital media tools and increasingly ubiquitous digital networks" (Gillmor, 2010: xvi)?

Several years ago I became convinced that the main characteristic of Internet use for social purposes was its interactivity (Bešker, 1999). Moreover, I have asserted that media discourse is dialogical by itself, implicitly or explicitly, and that new media discourse is explicitly dialogical, because of their inherent interactivity (Bešker, 2010).

What name should we give to the use of the media support as a substitute for representative mechanisms, as a vehicle for the transmission of directives to the voting

machine in Parliament and to the mass of supporters outside the representative bodies? Would eDirective be an appropriate term?

The purpose of eDemocracy – understood in Meier’s narrow sense – would be logistical support, information and informatics, to the processes of indirect representative democracy. The aim of Berlusconi’s and Grillo’s use of electronic media is just the opposite: to avoid any interactivity, any dialectic or any controversy; characteristics of parliamentary debate and discussion or interviews in the media. Their very objective seems to be to ensure unidirectional message, in fact a directive, as the basis of their political discourse. Although Berlusconi and Grillo do not operate in dictatorships their discourse is dictatorial.

The effects of interactivity in new media have already been called into question (Bešker, 2010, among others): should they be regarded *a priori* as participatory instruments (supporting eDemocracy) or does the receptor – a citizen – have to remain a passive object of the *in-formation*²⁰? With the advent of a politics of outsourcing, or even of crowdsourcing, we face a new stage, a new step towards the putting the so called “masses” on the pedestal of a political subject instead of the citizen. The history teaches that sometimes there was a very short way from the “mass”, as the sum of political individuals, to the crowd, characterized by anonymity, contagion and suggestibility, according to Le Bon²¹.

Let us remember that the misuse of media for inciting the crowd started neither with the new media²², nor in this century.

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²⁰ “In-formation” is seen as a shaping – even formatting of – a citizen, by careful selection of data offered in the media.

²¹ Gustave Le Bon (1841 – 1931), French social psychologist whose *The Psychology of Crowds* was object of careful study by Italian PM Benito Mussolini (he apparently kept it by his bedside), cfr. Alex Steiner, *Marxism Without Its Head or Heart: A Reply to David North*, www.permanent-revolution.org, 2007, p.272, http://www.permanent-revolution.org/polemics/mwhh_ch10.pdf (21.08.2013).

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NOVI MEDIJI I CROWDSOURCING POLITIKE: ČUDAN SLUČAJ DR. BERLUSCONIJA I G. GRILLA

Inoslav Bešker

SAŽETAK Glavni talijanski populist, Silvio Berlusconi i Beppe Grillo, osigurali su svoj uspjeh na parlamentarnim izborima 2013. uz pomoć vješte upotrebe elektroničkih medija i tradicionalnih masovnih mitinga. Pritom su izbjegavali debate s političkim protivnicima te su se klonili novinara. Poruka obojice, Grilla i Berlusconija, populistička je, izražava antistranačke stavove, demonizira protivnike, a u pristupu javnosti i politici fokus je na vođi. Iako Grillo i Casaleggio naglašavaju kako njihov PoKret (MoVimento) koristi internet za direktnu demokraciju, tvrdeći da politiku PoKreta u jednakoj mjeri kreiraju svi članovi, kroz svojevrstan crowdsourcing, Grillove poruke uglavnom su jednosmjerne direktive, prikladnije za diktatorski nego za demokratski diskurs.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

NOVI MEDIJI, POLITIKA, CROWDSOURCING, POPULIZAM, ITALIJA, GRILLO, BERLUSCONI

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FACEBOOK USAGE BY MAYORS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT *The ever increasing rise of social media network users consequently leaves a mark on political communication. While social media tools are already adopted in political marketing, primarily in election campaigning, governments are still new in using social media. The aim of this study is to examine how Facebook is used by city mayors in countries of Central and Southeastern Europe in two months period, from March 1st to April 30th of 2012. Using content analysis we first analyzed status messages in order to see what kind of status messages they post: personal or political. Secondly, we conducted an analysis of comments on the examined statuses, in order to examine if citizens make constructive, cynical, supportive or neutral comments. We examined ten city mayors' Facebook pages in five countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia and Slovenia. The results have revealed that city mayors in Central and Southeastern Europe use Facebook almost exclusively for official purposes. Secondly, the analysis of citizens' comments demonstrates that expressing cynicism on Facebook is not the trend in these countries. The findings further confirm that Facebook is a good platform for gathering supporters, while there were no strong evidence found that it serves as platform for constructive discussion. The paper finally discusses how politician's status messages can engage a larger number of citizens.*

KEY WORDS

E-DEMOCRACY, FACEBOOK, ONLINE ENGAGEMENT, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS

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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the importance of social media in everyday life became unquestionable and we are free to say that its' importance in the next years will only grow. Sites such as Facebook.com are the best example of the phenomenal growth social network sites have seen in recent years. Facebook was launched in 2004. In May 2013 it had more than one billion active monthly users¹. With the increase in popularity of social network sites, the potential for individuals to engage in online discussion increased as well. Citizens realized they finally had a platform where they can express their opinion and be sure that what they say will reach others. Meaning that your opinion is no longer trapped in your living room reaching only your family or in a bar reaching only your friends. Bearing this in mind, we wanted to see how this trend is reflected in the sphere of politics. We wanted to see how politicians present themselves on Facebook and how citizens act in response. While most of the research on this topic comes from western European countries and the United States (Chadwick, 2006; Papacharissi, 2009), little is known about the Facebook usage of politicians in Central and Southeastern Europe. Due to this notion and to the fact that little is known about political discourse on Facebook in general, the novelty of this study is unquestionable. In this study we shall be looking to new media as an outlet for the city mayors' rhetoric and a hub for citizens' responses. When looking at governmental rhetoric, the research focuses on the rhetoric of ten city mayors in five countries: Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria. The main point for citizens' response analysis is the citizens who are active online and who have commented at least once.

The study relies on literature on deliberative democracy. We share Stephen Coleman's (2003) beliefs that the new ICTs could contribute to a renewed faith in government bodies through the creation of a more transparent, interactive government engaged in wide dialogue with an interactive citizenry. We argue that citizens are willing to engage online if they have a platform for doing this. The issues raised by the city mayors in new media are assumed to be the issues the local government intends to communicate to the wider public, thereby putting them on the public agenda, engendering a more diverse discussion of them. Conducting content analysis we tried to find out how city mayors present themselves and how citizens respond to them. Relying on the literature about the personalization of politics (Norris, 2001; Van Zoonen, 2006; Corner and Pels, 2003), we coded status messages as personal and official, in order to see if the city mayors are using private issues to engage citizens. Furthermore, citizen's comments were coded as constructive, cynical, supportive and neutral.

Role of the Internet in politics

The growth of the internet and possible implications it might have for democracy and addressing interactivity as the key element led authors to explore possible changes in the nature of citizens' participation in politics and public life in general, believing that the

¹ <http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts> (13.05.2013).

Internet has the potential to restore the deteriorating public sphere by providing a forum in which citizens debate issues of public concern, hold those in power accountable and improve the existing form of democracy (Coleman, 2004; Street, 2001). John Street finds that the internet may offer solutions for problems that have been obstructing political participation – “time, size, knowledge and access” (2001: 217). James Curran even refers to Nicholas Negroponte to suggest that these developments generate a new world order based on international communication and popular empowerment (Negroponte, 1996, in Curran, 2000: 137). All these arguments are suggesting that political websites should provide infrastructure for deliberation and that political participation will follow (Chadwick, 2006: 26).

Optimistic viewpoints about the possible role of the internet in politics are strongly stressing the strengthening of ties between the representatives and the represented, a two way communication with citizens in the role of strengthening democracy (Coleman, 2001) and not just a new technique of political spin. Furthermore, Coleman noted that the democratic deficit is facing many governments and that two key questions arise from that: “How to make the political process more participatory; and how can public engagement in policies that affect everyday life become more deliberative?” (Coleman, 2003: 11). Hence, Coleman believes that the new ICTs could contribute to a renewed faith in government bodies through the creation of a more transparent, interactive government engaged in wide dialogue with an interactive citizenry. Substantial literature speculates that the Internet could strengthen civic engagement and political activism, especially for many groups currently marginalized from mainstream politics (Norris, 2001). Pippa Norris summarizes: “...the Internet offers to reconnect people to the political process by helping people become more informed citizens, by helping representatives become more responsive to citizens, and by engaging more people in public policy debates” (Norris, 2001: 163).

Yet, these enthusiastic conceptions of the Internet face several problems. It has been argued that the ties that bind members of a virtual community are not as strong as the old ties of family, locality, religion, or even political structures like local party and lobby group associations. The Internet, in this view, takes the impersonality of the modern society to a new level, substituting a diluted form of community and social capital for the real things (Doheny-Farina, 1996, in Chadwick, 2006: 27). The argument basically comes down to Robert Putnam’s idea that the only functional community is the one based on face-to-face communication (1994, 1995). Besides, face-to-face interaction usually imposes the well-known demands of basic civility. Andrew Chadwick argues that the “removal of such discipline from the online environment makes it much easier to express all manner of other prejudices flourish online, where individuals can hide behind the cloak of anonymity or pseudonym, both widely accepted practices in cyberspace” (Chadwick, 2006: 27).

The potential of the internet to create free public spheres of political has simultaneously been criticized for the poor quality of interaction between individuals, as well as their tendency to produce a plurality of deeply segmented political associations. “Democracy

involves deliberation and dialogue in the formation of collective goals, rather than the aggregation of individual preferences” argues Street (2001: 219). And the Internet is all about registering individual preferences. This concern has been probably best articulated in Berry Wellman’s (2003, in Chadwick, 2006: 27) conception of the Internet as a “hybrid form of networked individualism”.

Furthermore, when criticizing the model of replacing the public sphere with the new media, some scholars stress that the traditional public sphere is characterized by objectivity, while the highly personalized content of and individual interaction with new media excludes objectivity (Paparachissi, 2009). A major implication of the personalized nature of the new media sphere is that it is not a distinct and separate space reserved for objective discourse; unlike the public sphere, the new media sphere mixes readily with commercialized space and with work and family life (ibid).

RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Since 2008 and Obama’s election campaign Facebook become an inevitable part of political communication. Besides that, the fact that in May 2013 Facebook² had more than one billion monthly active users is something that not even one politician can ignore. Although a lot of research has already been done about new media and political communication, little is known about the discourse of politicians and citizens once they come together on some of these platforms. In order to find out more about the Facebook usage of politicians and citizens content analysis was used to analyze status messages and the discussion between city mayors and citizens.

A deductive approach to content analysis of citizens’ comments was applied meaning that the pilot analysis was conducted to predefine dominant categories which would be analyzed in the research. The results have revealed that the dominant categories are *cynical*, *constructive*, *supportive* and *neutral*. Status messages of city mayors were coded as *personal* and *political*, in order to see if the new media sphere is personalized when it comes to politics.

Thus, the main objective of this study is to answer the following research questions:

- RQ1: What kind of status messages do politicians use on Facebook, personal or political?
- RQ2: How do individuals interact once they have come together in an online discussion forum, in this case a city mayor’s Facebook page or profile?

² <http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts> (13.05. 2013).

Methodology

Although discourse analysis could also be easily applied on this research, content analysis, as a methodology for “making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969: 14), was deemed more adequate to identify and quantify categories in which citizens’ comments appear and to identify and quantify the types of messages politicians use on Facebook.

Pilot analysis was conducted only to reveal the categories in which citizens’ comments appear, while for the Facebook status messages of mayors we immediately applied two categories: personal and political, where personal referred to private life or used private language, and political to all status messages concerning official things and using official language. The pilot analysis for citizens’ comments revealed four categories: cynical, constructive, supportive and neutral. We coded as cynical those comments which consisted: negative/cynical/insulting comments without any supporting arguments, generally negative comments without making any reference to the issue addressed, comments in which citizens expressed disbelief that the authorities are going to indeed implement the project/policy (Bebić et al, 2012: 49). We coded as constructive those comments which: directly referred to the certain issue/policy and made positive or negative comments with supporting arguments, contained alternative solutions or propositions with supporting arguments, provided an informed opinion and applicable solutions with the issue addressed (ibid). Supportive were those which contained messages of support, without expressing any opinion or giving any arguments, congratulating messages.

The definition of “cynical” and “constructive” comments did not assume the support or disagreement with the issue discussed. The support for or the disagreement to the issue or person did not present a relevant variable for the comment to be classified as cynical or constructive. For instance, comments about the issue could be negative but if they were well argued and contained alternative solutions they were classified as “constructive”. Likewise, comments about the issue could be positive but if contained cynical/insulting comments they were classified as “cynical”.


Using Holsti’s (1969) method for agreement, the inter-coder reliability test was conducted with two independent coders on 40 randomly chosen comments. The average reliability score across categories was assessed at 0.98.

● Sample

The analysis included ten city mayors from five countries from Central (Slovenia and Hungary) and Southeastern Europe (Croatia, Macedonia and Bulgaria). Initially we wanted to include all countries from Central and Southeastern Europe, but due to language and financial limitations, the study was made on a sample of five countries. Facebook pages of city mayors were chosen on the basis of their Facebook activity. For each country we did preliminary analysis and tested Facebook pages of city mayors in several largest cities. Final analysis included Facebook pages of the most active city mayors in selected countries. The total number of status messages coded was 292 and the total number of comments was 1,821. In order to get a relevant sample of status messages and citizens’ comments for each country, those were coded in March and April in 2012.

PRIVATE AND POLITICAL ON FACEBOOK BY CITY MAYORS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Drawing on the notion that politics has generally become more personalized in the last few decades, especially in the western democracies, our first research question tried to examine if this phenomenon is present in Central and Southeastern Europe in the context of new media, more precisely Facebook. Results demonstrate that among 292 status messages 21% referred to personal issues or used private language (Graph 1), which means that city mayors in these countries are still not keen to present themselves as humanized and “one of us” (Norris, 2003; Scammell, 2000). Furthermore, results show that in most cases city mayors use Facebook only as a clipboard for official announcements. This conclusion is confirmed with the notion that only four among the ten city mayors examined answer to the citizens who comment or post a question on their Facebook wall. Most of them just write a status message and do not answer on citizens’ comments and questions.




▲ Graph 1
Personal and political in status messages

However, Graph 2 demonstrates that this is not the case in Croatia, where 49% of all status messages were coded as personal. Furthermore, in Croatia we have examined three Facebook profiles of city mayors (mayors of Zagreb, Velika Gorica and Pula), and we have found that all of them interact with citizens on their walls, meaning that they were answering and commenting on comments and questions citizens post to them. The city mayor of Pula, Boris Miletić, for instance has an album named “Love” where he has photos with his wife. He is also keen to express how he feels, for instance on April 1, 2012, when a football match was interrupted because of flares, he wrote: “Sad and disappointed ...” On the other hand, 51% of all his status messages are political. Moreover, the interactivity on his wall is big, and it mostly concerns political issues. For instance, on April 17, 2012, he discussed the problem of traffic with one of his citizens, using only official language.

In Slovenia we examined the profile of Zoran Janković, the city mayor of Ljubljana. Preliminary analysis revealed that Janković was very active on Facebook only in March in 2012, when he ran the election campaign for city mayor, while in April and May in 2012 he posted only a few of status messages in total. An interesting finding is that during his campaign he did not have even one personal status message, all his messages (49

in total in March) concerned official announcements and referred to campaign activities. On March 23, he writes: "Today we are visiting Rožnik. During the weekend we have an action of cleaning our city. On Sunday get out and vote yes for a better city. Looking forward to seeing you on the polls, every vote is important!" Furthermore, while it would be expected to see the "humanized" part of him, photos of family etc., Janković never used any of these campaign tools on Facebook during his campaign. Similar results were found in Macedonia. Two examined city mayors Koce Trajanovski (Skopje) and Zoran Zaev (Strumica), had only 5 personal messages among 74 status messages in total.

In Hungary we examined two city mayors' profiles, and found that Tétényi Éva, the city mayor of Esztergom, used private status messages in 27% of cases (8 among 30 examined status messages). For instance, on April 9 she writes: "Yesterday evening I attended the Easter mass at the monastery. Today, I will take a rest and write my blog." The city mayor of Budapest posted only one private message in the examined time period in which he strongly stated his opinion about the resignation of the Hungarian president: "That person, who took trouble to investigate Pál Schmitt's doctoral dissertation after twenty-some years in order to harm him, should consider that he caused more harm to the country than to Pál Schmitt. It is not my intention to pass judgment whether Pál Schmitt should resign or not, because of the withdrawal of his doctorate. This is a very unpleasant situation. I do not have the motivation to prescribe when someone should resign and when not."




▲ Graph 2
Personal and political in status messages by countries

Surprising results were found in Bulgaria while doing the preliminary analysis to select the city for our research. More than 20 cities were examined for Facebook profiles or fan pages of city mayors, but only two mayors with active profiles were found, Dimitar Nikolov, the city mayor of Burgas and Ivan B. Totev, the city mayor of Plovdiv, while the mayor of Sofia did not have a profile on Facebook at the time the research was done. This was the

only examined country where the mayor of the capital did not have a Facebook page or profile. In 18% of cases the status messages of the examined city mayors in Bulgaria were personalized, while most of the messages referred only to political issues. Although Facebook penetration in Bulgaria (33.6 penetration rate)³, is on a high level, it seems that city mayors in this country are still not eager to engage on this platform with their citizens.

CITIZENS ON CITY MAYORS' FACEBOOK PAGES

Early optimistic viewpoints that internet is a new platform that will improve democracy, decrease distrust in politics, strengthen ties between the representatives and the represented (Coleman, 2001; Street, 2001), has been criticized at many points. One of the main critiques is that the internet is just another tool for expressing citizens' cynicism and distrust. This study questions this theory by analyzing comments that citizens post on the Facebook pages of city mayors in five Central and Southeastern European countries. Contrary to pessimistic views on citizens' engagement in new media, we have found that only 17% of all comments were categorized as cynical (Graph 3). Furthermore, 18% of all comments (331/1821) were categorized as constructive, which means that Facebook can serve as a platform for constructive and rational discussion. Supportive comments dominated with 37%. If we evoke Obama's campaign from 2008, it is not surprising that the trend of gathering supporters on social media is also present in Central and Southeastern Europe. Neutral comments have been found in 28% of cases.




▲ Graph 3
Citizens' comments

Looking at the rate of cynicism in each country, we can see that in Croatia, Hungary and Macedonia, cynicism is low, moving in the range from 7 to 11%. In Slovenia 28% of all comments were cynical. However, as mentioned earlier the reasoning for a higher number of cynical comments could be in the elections, meaning that activity was higher

³ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2.htm#mk> (13.05.2013).

which also resulted in a higher level of cynical comments. Another possible explanation for cynicism on Janković's Facebook page could be the fact that he was very active on Facebook only during the campaign. In the months prior to the campaign he was posting only a few times a month. It is easy to conclude that the citizens noticed this and punished him with cynical comments. A similar explanation could work for Bulgaria, where more than 23% of all comments were cynical. As already mentioned, in Bulgaria, the city mayors were the least active. The two examined profiles within the time period of one month for Nikolov and two months for Totev, had 39 status messages altogether. Due to this notion, it is not surprising that citizens do not feel as the mayors are part of the community, and once they come online, citizens treat them cynically.




▲ Graph 4
Citizens' comments by countries

These are some examples of comments aimed at the mayor of Budapest István Tarlós:

● **Cynical comment:**

"This comment reminds me of a joke in which a circus is looking for a lion trainer who is preferably a tall, strong man and a short, tiny guy applies for the job. He is asked: 'Have you read the preferred criteria for the job?' He answers in a somewhat proud manner: 'Yes, I have, and I am here to tell you that I am not in!' So this post is exactly like this."



● **Constructive comment:**

"This is the difference between Germany and Hungary. There happened the same scandal, but secretary of defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg himself initiated the withdrawal of his own doctorate and then he resigned immediately."



● **Supportive comment:**

*"I agree, Mr. Mayor!"
"I think those who elected him will stick up for him."*



DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This analysis provided several conclusions. In the first place we have seen that Facebook has become an important tool in political communication and that no longer can one ignore its' presence in the real world. Politicians realized they had to join the platform which became enormously popular in the last few years. Bearing in mind that Facebook penetration in Central and Southeastern countries is at a high level⁴, this is not surprising. They have obviously realized that it would be unwise to avoid a tool that enables them to reach thousands of their citizens, regardless of the risks it brings at the same time.

Furthermore, contrary to the conclusions of some scholars who argue that new media are a more personalized sphere (Papacharissi, 2009), we have found that only in 21% of

⁴ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2.htm> (12.03. 2012).

cases the examined status messages of city mayors were personal, while most of the time they use Facebook as a bulletin-board for announcements of their political affairs. If we consider that trends in political communication are usually adopted from Anglo-Saxon democracies, it is only to be seen how social media will be used in politics in this part of Europe. Although, examining the trend of personalization of political communication on social media is way beyond the scope of this study, by looking only at status messages of city mayors, we can argue that this trend is still not present in Central and Southeastern Europe. However, as noted earlier, personalization of politics is too complex of a phenomenon to be discussed at this point.

Thirdly, looking at citizens' comments, we wanted to see how citizens communicate on city mayors' Facebook pages. In the first place we wanted to test the pessimistic theories which advocate the position that the internet will increase distrust and cynicism towards politics (Blumler, 1997; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Our findings suggest that social media in this case were not used for expressing cynicism and distrust. Only 17% of all comments were cynical. Furthermore, 18% of all comments were categorized as constructive, meaning that Facebook has a potential for rational and constructive discussion. Some scholars argue that only well-structured and controlled discussion can be rational and constructive (Schudson, 1992: 156). However, our study revealed that citizens are able to be constructive and rational, even when they are not guided to do that. Lastly, most of the comments were supportive (37%) and neutral (28%). This was expected, if we remember Obama's campaign and how he used social media to gather supporters.

The potential of Facebook for political communication is huge. One just has to find the right way to use it, and that way is different for everyone. There is no single rule that will "work" on Facebook. Further research should try to find evidence of what kind of status messages engage more citizens and what is needed to get more constructive and supportive comments.

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KAKO GRADONAČELNICI U ZEMLJAMA SREDNJE I JUGOISTOČNE EUROPE KORISTE FACEBOOK

Milica Vučković :: Domagoj Bebić

SAŽETAK Sve veći broj korisnika društvenih mreža ostavio je trag i na političku komunikaciju. Dok je upotreba društvenih mreža u političkom marketingu već uvriježena, prvenstveno u izbornim kampanjama, vlade i lokalna uprava i samouprava još su uvijek na početcima korištenja društvenih mreža. Cilj je ovog istraživanja ispitati kako gradonačelnici u zemljama srednje i jugoistočne Europe koriste Facebook. Koristeći analizu sadržaja, ispitali smo kakve status-poruke gradonačelnici stavljaju na svoje službene Facebook-stranice – privatne ili službene. Osim toga, analizirali smo komentare građana kako bismo utvrdili ostavljaju li građani konstruktivne, cinične, neutralne ili komentare potpore na stranicama gradonačelnika. Ispitano je deset službenih Facebook-stranica gradonačelnika u pet zemalja: Bugarskoj, Hrvatskoj, Mađarskoj, Makedoniji i Sloveniji. Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da gradonačelnici u navedenim zemljama koriste Facebook gotovo isključivo u službene svrhe. Analiza komentara građana ukazuje kako trend iskazivanja cinizma na Facebooku nije prisutan u zemljama srednje i jugoistočne Europe. Nalazi dalje upućuju na činjenicu da je Facebook dobra platforma za okupljanje simpatizera, ali nisu pronađeni dokazi da Facebook služi kao platforma za konstruktivnu raspravu.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

E-DEMOKRACIJA, FACEBOOK, ONLINE ANGAŽIRANOST, LOKALNA SAMOUPRAVA, DRUŠTVENE MREŽE, GRAĐANI

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QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION PATTERNS ON FACEBOOK: A CASE STUDY OF THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT

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ABSTRACT *In the process of involving citizens more deeply in the democratic process, Facebook is becoming an increasingly important tool for governments in policy making. Facebook has the potential to increase political participation, but many governments fail to use it in the right way, because they just share information online and do not engage with their followers/citizens. This paper shows how the Croatian government is using Facebook and the communication patterns resulting from their work. The quantitative analysis of 20,546 posts and 52,311 comments show that communication is one way, rather than interactive. Government users do not follow the 90-9-1- rule of thumb for social networks.*

KEY WORDS

SOCIAL MEDIA, FACEBOOK, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, E-GOVERNMENT, COMMUNICATION PATTERNS

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INTRODUCTION

Social media has rapidly changed everyday life. These new platforms enable individuals, businesses, organizations, governments and the whole of civil society to engage and interact. Using Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and other social media people can share information in real-time and together organize social demonstrations, mobilize different actions, bring down governments, or boost political campaigns and contribute to presidential wins.

“As the communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and more participatory, the networked population is gaining greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action” (Srivastava, 2013). On the other hand, governments worldwide use social media in order to spread awareness of its political plans and other policies, to enable two-way communication with their citizens and establish quality, long-term relationships. They strive to be more transparent, innovative and participatory (Whitehouse.gov, 2013). Governmental use of social media has become common practice over the last few years.

Mark Schaefer (2011) defined five ways social media today is transforming governments. Besides transparency, the humanization of government, crisis-management and real-time responses, there is a strong aspiration towards citizen engagement.

Studies showed that citizens who engage with government online have a more positive view of government. Promoting close online engagement creates better decisions by capturing local knowledge, increases capacity of society to understand complexity of problems and increases public support by legitimizing the solutions (ibid.).

The use of social media by government, or Government 2.0, is seen as a low-cost way to increase citizen participation, transparency, accountability, and service delivery in the public sector. However, the impact of these tools depends on a variety of factors, including the quality of content, specific local government practices, and citizen response. (Moore, 2013: 1)

It is a fact that the usage of social media does not assure engagement with citizens. There are many cases where governments even fail right now in using social media, because they still use it as a tool for one-way communication.

The aim of this paper is to explain how the Croatian government uses its official Facebook page as a new communication platform in order to engage with its citizens. Government use of social media in Croatia is a new practice, so it is important to see what communication model dominates, how often, how successful and what type of information do they deliver to the public. Following the introduction, the paper is organized into four main sections. The first one presents the characteristics of Facebook, with the emphasis on Facebook Pages. The second part describes new communication patterns that evolved in past years and how the Government should use the full potential of this social media. The third part presents the methodology used to examine the research questions and also summarizes the results. In the end, the fourth section discusses the findings and presents the potential limitations of this study.

FACEBOOK AS A COMMUNICATION CHANNEL

Facebook is “a social utility that helps people communicate with the people they know, and it is used by people to share comments, opinions, photos, and videos with their friends, family, acquaintances and colleagues. Facebook’s platform enables people to share information through their social graph, the digital map of people’s real-world connections.” (CIPR, 2012: 61).

Facebook Pages, as defined on their official website, help businesses, organizations and brands share their stories and connect with people. They can be customized by adding apps, posting stories, hosting events and more. Posting regularly provides better engagement and grows their audience. Pages look very similar to personal timelines, but they have different tools for connecting people with various brands, organizations, NGO’s, celebrities, shows etc.

Word of mouth is an effective marketing scheme offline, and it works online too. When a Facebook member surfs to a Page — by searching, browsing, or following a link he finds on another Facebook member’s profile — and likes what he sees, he clicks the Page’s “Like” button, then Facebook lists the Page on his profile and news of his fan status appears in his friends’ News Feeds (Vander Veer, 2011: 175).

Admins that manage pages can use available insights to the page that will help them understand how people interact with the page, what do they like, what is not interesting etc. There are some limited insights available to analyze how fans interact with the content shared on the Page. The types of data available are: a) basic demographics of Fans (age, gender, geographical networks); b) fans’ behavior (how many active users, interactions over time, which posts created the most interactions); c) reach and interaction (the number of post views, the number of people talking about the Page, impressions per post etc.) (CIPR, 2012: 63).

Each page has different posts and therefore engagement is different for each page. But, according to official website of Facebook Help Center¹ people respond very well to following types of posts: *facebook offers* (posting discounts and promotions is a good way to get the attention of new and existing customers), *photos and videos* (bright, colorful images depicting human interaction are particularly successful) and *questions* (asking questions encourages interaction and tells people their opinions matter). Besides these types of posts, admins can create different events, polls, sponsored stories etc.

The number of likes a Page has is often considered a measure of the overall success of a Page, with more likes associated with higher value and legitimacy. However, evaluating a Page based on its total number of likes is a superficial measure that does not provide information about engagement, popular content or what users are saying. (Moore, 2013: 2)

Facebook and all other social media can quickly generate many fans or enemies for a company. Thus, managers/admins must be able to operationalize their response rapidly – regardless of whether it is

¹ <https://www.facebook.com/help/281592001947683/> (03.07.2013).

reactive or proactive. Reactive capabilities are especially important. Social media is 24x7 public channels. There are no 'hours of business'. Facebook never "closes". At all times, companies must be prepared to identify emerging problems that could billow into something bigger. (Smith et al., 2011: 84)

COMMUNICATION PATTERNS AND FACEBOOK

Social media changed communication trends in a way that today we are witnessing new communication patterns online.

Communication patterns are shifting from point-to-point, two-way conversations to many-to-many, group communications and collaboration. There is also a shift in communication control (transition from provider-controlled environments to open Internet platform service providers with greater opportunities for user participation). (Van den Dam, Nelson, Lozinski, 2010: 6)

The personal becomes conversational, people share content (links, videos, photos etc.) and collaborate. Communication is now "highly participatory and highly social" and it is a fact that "social web is having a tremendous cultural impact on the broader society" (Davidson, 2011: 1).

Some earlier studies of Facebook usages among students have shown that students who used Facebook intensively the more they noticed "they were integrated into their university community and the more confident they were in their ability to secure support from distant high school and hometown relationships." (Manago et al., 2012: 370) Based on this finding it can be assumed that a somewhat similar discovery can be applied to citizen – government relationships. Being a part of a large online community with the possibility to participate in the decision-making processes puts citizens in a proactive role, gives them a sense of affiliation, importance and empowers the relationships they have with government, not just online, but also in the offline world. Young voters are living in an era of completely new communication trends and governments need to learn and understand new communication patterns and customize their own. Being transparent, participatory, cooperative honest, and continuously active are just some of the presumptions for having quality online government communication.

Governments on Facebook

Using websites and social media has become a common way for governments to provide information to their citizens. In 2009, the US issued an Open Government Directive (in the Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government); a document that prescribed specific actions that should be implemented in order to fulfill the Government's principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration. These principles

form the cornerstone of an open government. Transparency promotes accountability by providing the public with information about what the Government is doing. Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and expertise so that their government can make policies with the benefit of information that is widely dispersed in society. Collaboration improves the effectiveness of Government by encouraging partnerships and cooperation within the Federal Government, across levels of government, and between the Government and private institutions. (Whitehouse.gov, 2009)

Government information is no longer a static entity preserved in archives, a new era of government information management may foster web-based public collaboration and participation in government work, a development that could fundamentally change the way the government conducts its business. (Davidson, 2011: 2)

Civic engagement, or public participation, focuses on ensuring citizen and stakeholder awareness of and involvement in civic priority-setting, decision making, program development, and service delivery. (Fergusson et al., 2012: 10)

The International Association for Public Participation set a special spectrum of public participation levels that go from informing to empowering citizens. Everything begins from,

providing the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions (informing), gets to consulting, involving (working directly with the public to ensure that their concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered), collaboration (to partner with the public in each aspect of the decision) and in the end finishes with empowerment (final decision-making is in the hands of public). (IAP2, 2007)

Based on the above, our hypothesis is that Croatian Government, as a part of their e-government strategy, uses one way communication and fails in its use of the most popular online tool (Facebook) for informing and empowering citizens.

Using the communicative metrics for Facebook and the hypothesis we construed the following research questions:

RQ1: Is the content published on the Facebook Fan Page by the Croatian government aimed at a facilitating two-way communication with citizens?

RQ2: Does the Croatian government take into account patterns of citizens' behavior / activities when publishing content on its Facebook Fan Page.

RQ3: Do the citizens sufficiently engage on the Croatian government's Facebook Fan Page?

RQ4: Does the Croatian government communicate with citizens on its Facebook Fan Page directly and how do they do it?

METHOD

The collected data was analyzed using a qualitative content analysis. The data was collected with web scraping software Nvivo 10 and it was collected from February 20th to April 23rd 2013. During that period we managed to collect 20,546 posts and 52,311 comments that were published on the Facebook page of the Croatian government. The total number of other people posting on the Government's page was of 8,490 (post authors) and commenting 15,688 (comment authors).

This study analyzed the Facebook page of the Croatian government that was available for public view in order to determine how many fans the Government had, what

information was communicated on the page, what communication patterns and routines were used, the use of photos and videos, the level of engagement and whether the site generated feedback (McCorkindale, 2010).

The units of the analysis were posts and comments with their descriptive data (time and date of publishing, author and type of post).

The content analysis consisted of these categories: type of post, time of post, time of the comment, number of likes and number of comments.


RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Jakob Nielsen in 2006 set a new informal rule in online communities.


He studied the phenomenon of participation inequalities in large online communities. He proposed the so-called 90-9-1 rule for user participation, which is widely accepted among researchers today: 90% of users never contribute, 9% of users contribute from time to time, but other priorities dominate their time, and 1% of users participate a lot and account for most contributions. (Beck, 2007:48)

The rule 90-9-1 (or participation inequality) was not confirmed in this case, because the Croatian government in this period had 49% least active users, 29% highly active ones and 22% of those who were defined as lead users. Opposite to Twitter (Bruns, 2012), we found that the least active users did not remain silent. Some researchers suggest that contributors to online communities are often motivated with a three key senses "efficacy – a sense that they are a part of community and have an effect on environment or an impact on a group; anticipated reciprocity whereby users contribute if they believe they'll benefit in return; and finally increased reputation and recognition online." (Freyne et al., 2009: 85)


Since the lead users - contributors and those who participate occasionally represent more than 50% of all Facebook users in the case of the Croatian government, it could be concluded that they contribute for at least one of the above reasons we mentioned. Therefore the Croatian government can use its Facebook page for strengthening its position if it finds a good communication pattern for building relationship with those citizens who are online contributors.




Among them, the top post author had 275 posts during this period, and the Government itself had 84 posts. Regarding the type post, we found that 65% of all published posts were status updates (Graph 2) which also had the most likes, because research shown that 73% off all likes on the Government’s page went for status updates (Graph 3). The second most common posts were links to different websites, 20%, but they were not in balance with the number of likes, since the second most “liked” type of post was video update (in 11% cases).



On the Croatian government’s page during the research period there were 2,235 videos published (11% of all posts) and 801 photos (only 4%). Posted photos had more than 20,000 likes (10%) and posted links had 6% of all likes.




There is a big difference in comparison with types of posts published only by the Croatian government. 85% of all posts published were photos (photos of the Prime Minister, other politicians in the Government, different political/cultural/educational events, actions etc.) They published 12 videos and only one status update during the research period.




▲ *Graph 4*
Type of Government's posts

On the other hand, the number of Government's likes on published photos is more than 2,000 (to be exact 2,262 likes; 51%), 38% likes on video posts, an 11% of likes goes to status posts. It is evident that communication in this case is in one direction. Unfortunately, the Croatian government uses Facebook only as a tool for informing citizens/followers and just sharing information without engaging in a dialogue.




▲ *Graph 5*
Likes vs. types of Government's posts

Concerning the comments and likes towards posts that the Government published, it is obvious that citizens want to express their opinion and the number of comments on only one status update reached up to 484 comments (2% of total number of comments), there were 3,990 comments on videos, creating a 20% share of all comments, and there were 15,617 comments (78%) on posted photos. The most "liked" content were photos (18,701 likes, 90% of total "likes"), and then in only 8% videos and one status update had 2% of all likes.




▲ Graph 6
Comments and likes on the Government's posts

Graph 7 shows how many posts the Government had during the research period. We found that the Government's communication was not regular or consistent, and there were even days when the Government was not active. An inactive Facebook page sends a signal that Government does not care about any kind of problems or good suggestions their citizens post. The fact is that incoherent communication and online presence is not good for building quality and long-term relationship with people who *liked* the page. There was even a gap of three days that saw no Facebook activity. If you want to achieve a good online presence that could lead you to empowering your position in the "real world" than you need to maintain it and communicate with your audience on daily, or better to say hourly – basis.




▲ Graph 7
Number of posts per day

This study shows the number of comments and likes rises when the situation in politics, the economy, social welfare, etc., changes or when there is some kind of public event. So, in this case Croatian government's most "liked" post was the one referring to a football match between Croatia and Serbia. Other commented and "liked" posts were about the financial crisis (International Monetary Fund), coalition problems, criticism of the Croatian President Ivo Josipović etc.



▲ Graph 8
Comments and likes during important events


The usual explanation of a good engagement rate is that anything above the 1% engagement rate is good, 0.5-0.99% is average and if it is below 0.5% that means that posted messages should be changed in a way to gain more attention and fulfill the expectations of your followers. According to SocialBakers (2012) Croatian government's Facebook page should have an engagement rate of 0.16% (because it has between 100 and 200 thousand fans). This study shows that the engagement rate in this case is better than we expected, because on some days the engagement rate is more than 2%, but the average rate is somewhere around 0,5%.



▲ Graph 9
Engagement rate


This can be explained with fact that the Government's Facebook Page is seen as a Habermans' public sphere.

Although studies showed that posting on Wednesdays increases the fan engagement rate (Miller, 2012), and that "on Wednesdays fan engagement rate is 8% above average and to improve engagement it is best to publish on Wednesdays and Sundays" (Bullas, 2012), Graph 10 shows that the Croatian government did not follow that rule. Results show that only 12% (9 posts) were published on Wednesday, and the most posts were published on Tuesday (25% of all posts).




▲ Graph 10
Government's posts per weekday

Posts published between 8 pm and 7 am will receive 14% higher interaction than the posts between 8 am and 7 pm. The interaction rate for weekend posts is 14.5% higher than weekday posts, yet only 14% of posts are published on weekends. (Sebastian, 2013) The government was active online between 10 am and 10 pm and the majority of all posts were published around 12 am and 6 pm, as Graph 11 shows.



▲ Graph 11
Government's posts and time of day

Graph 12 shows that fans commented actively during the whole day, and the fact, which can be alerted to those who administer the Page, is that there were lots of comments in periods when nobody managed it (for example, after 10 pm). Also, we noticed that commenting is connected with other side activities (Government).



▲ Graph 12
Number of comments and time of day

The EdgeRank (2012) results showed that the average post lifetime for a page is 3 hours and 7 minutes. Our study found that average post lifetime for posts published by all users is 1 hour and 33 minutes, and those that were published by the Croatian government was a little more than 2 hours.

Table 1. Life-span of the post

Life of the post	All users	Croatian Government
Min	00:00:06	00:00:10
Max	21:59:48	14:43:22
Average	01:33:04	02:02:08

The majority of all comments, 69% were posted by men (48,990), and 31% (21,920) by women. The Croatian government itself was the top commenter with 2,198 comments (the commenter with the second most number of comments had less than a thousand

comments). But, if you put that number in relation with all the comments, then that is only 4% of all comments in that period. Other users combined had more than 50 thousand comments (96%). It is not surprising that the most commented post were those posted by the Government.

Concerning direct communication using @ to tag other users in status updates, there were 109 mentions (@), but none directed to the Croatian government. 76 Government comments contained different e-mail addresses (referring to the ministries and agencies) and more than 800 comments contained Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http address).

CONCLUSION

Based on above data and discussion we can conclude that our hypothesis is confirmed. The Croatian government uses the Facebook for one way communication and not in the way that brands use Facebook – to engage and to inform. Also, opposite to their Twitter presence (Twiplomacy.com, 2013), the Government fails in the production of the content (messages) for its citizens. This is especially problematic because Croatian citizens are very active and engaged on Facebook and they see the Government's Facebook Page as a public sphere.

It is a fact that social media influence and transform today's governments and it is necessary for them to accommodate to these new trends. Facebook is just one of the many communication platforms that gives opportunity to governments to share information and get feedback from many people, in a short time, and for free. On the other hand citizens get directly involved, contribute and participate. All of this is possible only when governments (or better to say - people in charge for social media communication) understand the importance of using new media in the right way. Besides the simple sharing of information (or simple posting photos in the case of the Croatian government) they need to start a dialogue with their fans. They need to gain attention, and later on trust, in order to ensure they will have the citizens' support. This is only possible when you have two-way communication that will include the production of content that will be informative, educational and even sometimes entertaining. Of course, being active and present online most of the time is crucial.

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KVANTITATIVNA ANALIZA SADRŽAJA KOMUNIKACIJSKIH OBRAZACA NA FACEBOOKU: STUDIJA SLUČAJA VLADE REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE

Mato Brautović :: Romana John :: Iva Milanović-Litre

SAŽETAK *U razdoblju sve intenzivnijeg uključivanja građana u demokratske procese Facebook postaje sve važniji alat političara, točnije vlada, u političkom odlučivanju. Facebook može osnažiti političku participaciju, no mnoge ga vlade ne koriste na ispravan način, već samo objavljuju informacije online i ne povezuju se sa svojim građanima, u ovom slučaju – fanovima. Ovaj rad prikazuje način na koji Vlada Republike Hrvatske koristi Facebook te komunikacijske obrasce koji proizlaze iz djelovanja Vlade. Iz kvantitativne analize 20 546 objava (posts) i 52 311 komentara proizlazi da Vlada RH isključivo koristi jednosmjerni model komuniciranja. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da se u ovom specifičnom slučaju nije potvrdilo uobičajeno pravilo 90-9-1 kojim se internetska publika svrstava u određene kategorije prema svojoj online participaciji.*

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

DRUŠTVENE MREŽE, FACEBOOK, POLITIČKA PARTICIPACIJA, E-VLADA, KOMUNIKACIJSKI OBRASCI

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DRUŠTVENE MREŽE KAO IZVOR VIJESTI U NAJGLEDANIJIM SREDIŠNJIM INFORMATIVNIM EMISIJAMA U HRVATSKOJ

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SAŽETAK *Polazeći od pretpostavke da novinari prilikom traženja vijesti ne zanemaruju ni najbrže rastući trend komunikacije – društvene mreže, ovaj je rad jedan od prvih koji istražuje korištenje društvenih mreža kao izvora vijesti u središnjim informativnim emisijama. Metodom analize sadržaja od 1. ožujka do 31. svibnja 2013. analizirani su prilozi u središnjim informativnim emisijama Hrvatske televizije (HTV) i Nove TV. Namjera ovog rada jest ispitati u kojoj mjeri društvene mreže služe kao izvor vijesti u televizijskom novinarstvu. Analizom je utvrđeno da se društvene mreže uistinu koriste kao izvor informacija te da novinari najčešće prenose vijesti s Facebooka i Twittera. Također, uočene su određene razlike u izvještavanju o događajima s društvenih mreža između HTV-a i Nove TV.*

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

DRUŠTVENE MREŽE, TELEVIZIJA, NOVINARSTVO, IZVOR VIJESTI, HTV, NOVA TV

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Rad se temelji na istraživanju koje je Marija Volarević uz mentorstvo doc. dr. sc. Domagoja Bebića provela kao studentica Diplomskog studija novinarstva na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu i za koji je dobila Rektorovu nagradu za akademsku godinu 2012./2013.

UVOD

U samo nekoliko godina društvene su mreže postale svjetski trend i uvelike su promijenile način svakodnevne komunikacije. Tako su od platforme za neformalnu komunikaciju ubrzo prepoznate kao potencijalni promotivni alat u poslovnom sektoru gdje se ostvaruje izravna komunikacija s klijentima, korisnicima i potrošačima. Sve je veći broj tvrtki koje su upravo s pomoću društvenih mreža unaprijedile svoje poslovanje. Društvene mreže nisu zaobišle ni civilni sektor koji ih osim za promociju koristi i za aktiviranje građana. Nastupile su promjene i u političkoj komunikaciji pa su danas društvene mreže neizostavan alat političkog marketinga i vladinih strategija za uključivanje građana. Sve šira upotreba društvenih mreža u komunikaciji s korisnicima rezultirala je time da su i novinari počeli uzimati u obzir ove platforme prilikom pretraživanja vijesti. Novi mediji, a posebno društvene mreže, u samo nekoliko godina postali su alat za otkrivanje i praćenje važnih događaja. Specifičnost im leži u tome da za vijest istovremeno saznaju i korisnici i novinari, čime se uvelike promijenio odnos publike i medija.

Polazeći od pretpostavke da su društvene mreže jedan od značajnih fenomena komunikacije ovog desetljeća te da je njihova primjena vidljiva u svim segmentima komunikacije, ovaj rad istražuje u kojoj su mjeri društvene mreže kao izvor informacija zastupljene u najgledanijim središnjim informativnim emisijama u Hrvatskoj. U Hrvatskoj se najviše gledaju informativni i politički sadržaji na nacionalnim televizijama od kojih je najgledaniji Dnevnik Nove TV, a slijedi ga Dnevnik HTV 1.¹

U teorijskom dijelu rada objašnjava se koliko su internet i posebno društvene mreže utjecali na promjenu televizijskog načina izvještavanja te kako se promijenio odnos prema publici koju televizijski novinari moraju uzeti u obzir. U analitičkom dijelu rada odgovara se na tri istraživačka pitanja. Koristeći analizu sadržaja, analizirali smo priloge središnjih informativnih emisija HTV-a i Nove TV tijekom ožujka, travnja i svibnja 2013.

Budući da društvene mreže imaju sve veću važnost u svakodnevnoj komunikaciji, cilj je ovog rada istražiti upotrebu i navođenje društvenih mreža kao izvora informacija u najgledanijim središnjim informativnim emisijama u Hrvatskoj. Zadaća ovog rada nije istražiti koji se sve izvori vijesti koriste u središnjim informativnim emisijama, već mu je zadaća istražiti navode li se društvene mreže kao izvor informacija u središnjim informativnim emisijama dviju najgledanijih hrvatskih televizija te postoje li razlike u navođenju objava preuzetih s društvenih mreža između javne i komercijalne televizije.

Iako je gotovo dva desetljeća Dnevnik HTV-a bio najgledanija emisija u zemlji, od 2010. to mjesto zauzima središnja informativna emisija Nove TV.² Ovim istraživanjem htjeli smo utvrditi jesu li se u najgledanijim emisijama na hrvatskim nacionalnim televizijama društvene mreže počele koristiti kao izvor vijesti te, ako jesu, postoji li razlika u navođenju izvora vijesti između javne i komercijalne televizije. Nadalje, cilj je analize bio utvrditi koju društvenu mrežu novinari najčešće koriste kao izvor informacija. Istraživanje je obuhvatilo ukupno 3313 priloga emitiranih u 184 središnje informativne emisije HTV-a i Nove TV.

¹ AGB Nielsen Media Research, rujan 2012.

² AGB Nielsen Media Research, rujan 2010.

Koristeći analizu sadržaja ovaj će rad pokušati odgovoriti na tri istraživačka pitanja:

P1: Koriste li se društvene mreže kao izvor vijesti u središnjim informativnim emisijama i, ako da, u kojoj mjeri?

P2: Postoji li razlika u prenošenju informacija s društvenih mreža između javne i komercijalne televizije u Hrvatskoj?

P3: Koja se društvena mreža najčešće koristi kao izvor informacija?

TEORIJSKI OKVIR

Rastuća snaga interneta

Rastuća snaga interneta i društvenih mreža nezaobilazan je faktor u današnjem načinu komuniciranja te ubrzanom tempu svakodnevnog života. Broj korisnika interneta u svijetu obuhvaća 40 % cjelokupne svjetske populacije.³ Internet je sveprisutan, a nove tehnologije i koncepti stalno se razvijaju. Stranice za društveno umrežavanje postaju sve važnije platforme u svakodnevnom korištenju interneta, a time postaju i važan faktor načina komuniciranja. U samo nekoliko godina društvene su mreže zahvatile preko 50 % internetske populacije⁴ i postale neizostavna stavka u svakodnevnoj komunikaciji. Sadržaj koji na internetu kreiraju korisnici postaje sve važniji i u digitalnoj medijskoj konzumaciji. Taj novi oblik promocije zamjenjuje dosadašnje načine komuniciranja kako s novinarima tako i sa samim korisnicima.

Danas u Hrvatskoj preko 60 % stanovnika koristi internet.⁵ Kada govorimo o društvenim mrežama, građani Hrvatske najaktivniji su na dvjema društvenim mrežama – Facebooku i Twitteru. Aktivnih Facebook-korisnika u Hrvatskoj je milijun i 600 tisuća, odnosno 35,86 % građana⁶, dok je na Twitteru aktivno 52 tisuće građana⁷.

Revolucija društvenih mreža dovela je i do brojnih promjena u komunikaciji u svim sektorima. Nakon što su uslijedile promjene u korporativnom poslovanju, marketingu i odnosima s javnošću, uslijedile su i u novinarstvu. Primjerice, jedan od prvih koraka nove hrvatske vlade bio je otvaranje Facebook-profila i Twitter-profila koje aktivno vodi. Također, veliki broj ministara aktualne vlade svakodnevno komunicira na svojim društvenim profilima. „Zahvaljujući internetu kao novinarskom izvoru, novinari više nisu ovisni o službama za odnose s javnošću, jer mogu političke elite nadzirati bez njihove pomoći te uspoređivati njihove informacije i podatke s onima dostupnima na internetu“ (Brautović, 2011a: 16). Komunikacija s publikom također se promijenila – publika više nije pasivni primatelj informacija koji za pregled dnevnih događaja čeka poslijepodnevne informativne emisije. Publici su danas dostupne velike količine informacija na brojnim *online* platformama, što je promijenilo i proces pretraživanja, obrade i plasiranja vijesti. Time se promijenio i odnos

³ Prema podatcima na mrežnoj stranici Internet Live Stats 2014. broj korisnika interneta doseže 2 917 556 300, što obuhvaća 40 % svjetske populacije.

⁴ Podatci eMarketera za travanj 2013. govore da je broj korisnika društvenih mreža u 2013. godini dosegao brojku od milijardu i 730 milijuna svjetske populacije.

⁵ Prema istraživanju Eurobarometra, 2013.

⁶ Prema podatcima agencije Anadolu, veljača 2013.

⁷ Prema podatcima agencije Drap, veljača 2013.

novinara i publike. „Čini se da novi mediji mogu pružiti potencijalni zaokret moći od pošiljatelja prema primatelju, stvarajući puno više različitog sadržaja dostupnog korisnicima bez ovisnosti o sistemima masovne komunikacije“ (McQuail, 1987: 40).

Nora Paul s instituta The Poynter Institute razlikuje dvije osnovne vrste novinarskih izvora na internetu: primarne i sekundarne. U prvu skupinu izvora idu mrežni izvori koji omogućuju kontakte s osobama, odnosno omogućuju davanje komentara, diskusiju i izražavanje stavova. U tu se skupinu ubrajaju: elektronička pošta, *news*-grupe, diskusijske liste, forumi, *chat*, *online* društvene mreže, blogovi, *online* baze podataka... S druge strane, u skupinu sekundarnih izvora ubrajamo mrežne stranice koje sadrže članke, izvještaje, studije (Brautović, 2011a: 16).

Jedno od osnovnih pravila u dobroj novinarskoj praksi jest provjeriti svaku informaciju prije objavljivanja i navesti njezin izvor. Vjerodostojnost društvenih mreža kao izvora informacija uvijek se potvrđuje dodatnim izvorima. Nije autentično i sukladno novinarskoj praksi oblikovati vijest na temelju jednog *e-maila*, objave na društvenim mrežama ili *posta* na blogu. Ti materijali mogu biti vrijedan izvor za priču, no takvu informaciju treba uvijek provjeriti s autorom objave kako bi vijest dobila na vjerodostojnosti.

Vrijednost novinarske profesije, a time i vjerodostojnost pojedinog medija ogleđa se u provjeravanju svake informacije iz najmanje dva izvora, širenju tolerancije, izbjegavanju govora mržnje i stereotipa. Vrijednost novinarske profesije očituje se i u nepristranosti, odnosno potpunosti informacije, svođenju pogrešaka na najmanju moguću mjeru, čuvanju kulture dijaloga. To je uvijek bio temelj profesionalnoga odnosa prema novinama i mediju (Tomašić, 2010: 129).

Korisnici danas imaju pristup milijunima novosti koje su objavljene na internetu, što im omogućava da odaberu novosti i izdavača. U takvu okruženju u kojem je korisnicima dostupan velik broj izvora model jednosmjernog komuniciranja izgubio je svoju ulogu, a kontrolu su preuzeli korisnici. Urednici tako nisu više *gatekeepers* (urednici koji kontroliraju sadržaj), nego su sada *gatewatchers* (korisnici koji kontroliraju sadržaj) (Brautović, 2011b: 153). Time se ne umanjuje uloga novinara kao „psa čuvara“, nego se samo mijenja njegova zadaća unutar procesa proizvodnje i odabira vijesti. I dok je prije zadaća urednika i novinara bila oblikovanje i selekcija informacija za masovne medije, danas se oni moraju nositi s nizom novih izazova. Pojava društvenih mreža u samo nekoliko godina promijenila je način komuniciranja i informiranja. Korisnici su navikli dobiti informaciju odmah i biti dio novinarskog procesa, čime se dinamika izvještavanja uvelike promijenila. Brzina i stalna umreženost postale su ključne stavke u novinarskom poslu. Kanali, kao što je primjerice Twitter, postali su brži i interaktivniji od portala, a posebno od televizije, radija i tiska. Mogućnost dijeljenja, komentiranja i stvaranja sadržaja korisnicima je puno zanimljivija od pasivnog primanja informacija putem *mainstream* medija. Društvene mreže novinarima služe prije svega kao filter vijesti te kao servis za pretraživanje informacija i osoba. No, najznačajnija uloga društvenih mreža u novinarstvu jest ta da služe za otkrivanje i praćenje važnih događaja, jer se u *online* sferi daje dojam izvještavanja uživo.

Društvene mreže okupljaju na stotine milijuna ljudi i, osim što služe za objavljivanje popularnog i zabavnog sadržaja, profesionalno udruživanje, politički aktivizam... sve se više koriste i kao izvori vijesti

u novinarstvu. Tako online društvene mreže u novinarstvu sve više služe za pronalaženje kontakata, stručnjaka, komunikaciju s izvorom, te pronalaženje ideja za novinarske priče (Brautović, 2011b: 170).

Ne postoji dvojba oko činjenice da televizija prolazi kroz transformaciju i da se javlja potreba za njezinim redefiniranjem kao medija. Internet je uveo nove standarde i informacijske usluge i zbog sve bržeg načina života javila se potreba da i televizija pruži novi, drukčiji, vremenski dostupniji i različiti informativno-zabavni sadržaj (Car, 2007: 7).

Redakcija i desk znatno su se promijenili posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća. Nekada se do informacija dolazilo samo iz „pouzdatih“ izvora, telefonskim razgovorima, sastancima, čitajući novine. Danas je situacija potpuno drukčija. Postoje mnogi izvori primanja informacija, od klasičnih izvora novinskih agencija, ali i PR agencija, koje redakcije bombardiraju priopćenjima, do interneta, blogova, You Tubea (Perišin i Škaljac, 2009: 213).

Internet je odgojio novu generaciju publike koja ima potrebu informacije doznati odmah te na njih dati povratnu informaciju. Upravo je to postala osnova u novom načinu izvještavanja i u korištenju novih platformi za obradu informacija. Prevlad jednog medija na tržištu ne događa se preko noći, nego tijekom vremena mediji utječu jedni na druge te se prilagođavaju novim tržišnim situacijama. Iako je do prije nekoliko godina televizija bila dominantan medij masovne komunikacije, zadnjih nekoliko godina javila se potreba njezine evolucije iz klasičnog medija u medij nove tehnologije. Nije samo promjena u društveno-političkom okruženju konstantna i kontinuirano utjecajna na prirodu proizvodnje vijesti, nego je to i promjena u tehnologijama kojima se vijesti proizvode i dostavljaju korisnicima (Perišin, 2010: 220).

Revolucija *online* medija, a posebno društvenih mreža unutar njih, prisilila je televizijske redakcije da se prilagode novim izazovima te počnu koristiti sve dostupne sadržaje i platforme kako bi se ponovno nametnule na tržištu. Tako su se društvene mreže danas naširoko počele koristiti u novinskim redakcijama, posebno Facebook – platforma za društveno umrežavanje i Twitter – *microblogging*-kanal čiji korisnici šalju i primaju poruke s ograničenjem na 140 znakova. Za novinare važnost društvenih mreža posebno se ogleda prilikom izvještavanja izvanrednih vijesti (Lysak i dr., 2012: 190).

Klasičan način obrade i emitiranja vijesti na televiziji više ne funkcionira. Promjene u tehnologijama i novim kanalima utjecale su i na način izvještavanja. Danas komunikacijske i društvene platforme na internetu zahtijevaju stalnu uključenost i monitoring sadržaja, jer se događaji i vijesti prate u stvarnom vremenu, što je promijenilo novinarstvo kakvo smo dosad poznavali.

Nacionalni televizijski kontekst u Hrvatskoj – od 1990. do 2013.

Nakon prvih slobodnih izbora u Hrvatskoj te nakon konstituiranja nove vlasti donesen je novi Zakon o informiranju kojim je Zagrebačka televizija preimenovana u Hrvatsku televiziju. 5. studenog 1990. godine HTV se i formalno izdvojio iz organizacijske strukture Jugoslavenske televizije, a 1992. HTV je primljen u punopravno članstvo Eurovizije (Šalković, 2000: 23).

Budući da je bila jedina televizija s nacionalnom koncesijom, ubrzo je prepoznata kao moćan alat vladajuće stranke kojim su u očima javnosti mogli konstruirati željenu sliku ratnog stanja koje je u to vrijeme potresalo Hrvatsku. Cijelo je desetljeće javna televizija bila pod monopolom vladajuće stranke. Novo desetljeće obilježilo je i početak emitiranja prve komercijalne televizije u Hrvatskoj. Nova TV počela je s emitiranjem 28. svibnja 2000. godine, a 2004. godine na medijsko tržište ušla je nova komercijalna televizija u Hrvatskoj u vlasništvu RTL Grupe.

Od 2011. godine u Hrvatskoj je analogno emitiranje programa zamijenilo digitalno koje je donijelo više tržišnih prilika i bolje tehničke uvjete. „Potpunom digitalizacijom televizijskog emitiranja prestala je analogna televizijska era, a digitalne koncesije dobili su i novi ‘specijalizirani’ televizijski kanali“ (Peruško, 2012: 7). U Hrvatskoj je proces digitalizacije tekao postupno, a do 2011. obuhvatio je cijelu zemlju. „Digitalizacija je promijenila način kako se proizvode vijesti, internet je promijenio način na koji korisnici primaju vijesti. Digitalna tehnologija je jeftinija, oprema je manja i lakša, što omogućuje i građanima da se njome koriste za proizvodnju vijesti“ (Perišin i Škaljac, 2009: 214). Tim korakom omogućena je kvalitetnija slika, bolja pokrivenost signalom u cijeloj zemlji te veći broj programa.

U sve konkurentnijem medijskom tržištu postavlja se pitanje opstanka javne televizije. Tehnološki i ideološki europski koncept javne televizije je zastario. Doba monopola pod zaštitom politike i općih kanala čija se programska ponuda temelji na plemenitim načelima da se publici ponude samo oni sadržaji koji bi je duhovno obogatili, nepovratno je prošlo. Javna radiotelevizija više nikada neće imati onu važnost i tako brojnu publiku kakvu je imala u predsatelitsko i preddigitalno doba (Matković, 2000: 119).

Središnje televizijske informativne emisije u Hrvatskoj

Kao i u mnogim zapadnoeuropskim zemljama s deregulacijom i pojavom komercijalnih televizija i u većini tranzicijskih zemalja pala je gledanost javne televizije, osobito informativnih emisija. „I dok su se u zemljama Zapadne Europe javne televizije uglavnom oporavile i stabilizirale, u tranzicijskim je zemljama proces preobrazbe državotvorne televizije u javni servis tekao presporo“ (Perišin, 2010: 52). Prema Zakonu o Hrvatskoj radioteleviziji javna televizija u svojim programima mora zadovoljiti interese javnosti na državnoj, regionalnoj i lokalnoj razini te osigurati odgovarajuću zastupljenost informativnog, umjetničkog, kulturnog, obrazovnog, dječjeg, zabavnog, športskog i drugog sadržaja.⁸

Kao dominantan izvor informacija televizijske vijesti imaju veliku mogućnost utjecati na našu svakidašnjicu i stvarati percepciju o temama i događanjima koji su važni u društvu (Dimmick i Giant, 2000: 628). Iako je Dnevnik HTV-a bio u službi vladajuće političke elite (Perišin, 2010: 58), nije gubio na svojoj popularnosti. Javnost je emisiju doživljavala kao vjerodostojan prikaz dnevnih događanja u zemlji i svijetu gdje su se objavljivali samo najvažniji događaji toga dana.

Dolaskom komercijalne televizije u Hrvatsku emisija Dnevnik na javnoj televiziji prvi put dobila je konkurenciju. Nova TV imala je drukčiji pristup obradi i emitiranju vijesti,

⁸ Zakon o Hrvatskoj radioteleviziji, NN 137/10, 76/12.

drukčiju scenografiju te posebno drukčiji nastup voditelja (Perišin, 2010: 115). Za voditelja je poželjno da bude dobar novinar, ali ne mora nužno biti i urednik emisije koju vodi. Urednik Dnevnika HTV-a ujedno je i jedan od dvojice urednika te emisije, dok je u mnogim drugim redakcijama običaj da sve konce emisije drži urednik „iza kamere“.

Senzacionalistički pristup emitiranju i vođenju emisije na Novoj TV postupno je postajao zanimljiviji gledateljima te je tako popularnost središnje informativne emisije na HTV-u, nakon dva desetljeća dominacije medijskim tržištem, počela opadati te je danas Dnevnik Nove TV najgledanija informativna emisija u zemlji.⁹

Druga bitna stvar koja razlikuje središnje informativne emisije javne i komercijalne televizije u Hrvatskoj jest duljina trajanja dnevnika. Dok Dnevnik Nove TV traje i do 50 minuta te gledateljima pruža puno više analitičkih priloga, televizijskih fičera (engl. *features*), čak i reportaža, Dnevnik HTV-a i dalje je dosta štur i sažet u svom izvještavanju. Posljednjih godina, pogotovo otkako marketinško vrijeme koje koristi HTV strogo motri i konkurencija, ustalilo se da Dnevnik traje 22 – 25 minuta, bez priloga Sport i Prognoza (Perišin, 2010: 60).

Govorimo li o ulozi i položaju televizijskog novinarstva u eri novih medija, svjetska praksa pokazuje da se publika sve više informira na društvenim mrežama. No, zanimljiv je podatak da iako je primjerice u SAD-u razvoj društvenih mreža ugrozio dominaciju televizije,¹⁰ u Hrvatskoj je televizija i dalje dominantan izvor informacija¹¹.

METODOLOGIJA

Zašto analiza sadržaja?

Budući da je namjera ovog rada istražiti u kojoj mjeri društvene mreže služe kao izvor vijesti u televizijskom novinarstvu, analiza sadržaja kao korisna istraživačka metoda za opisivanje i kvantificiranje fenomena u određenom području (Heo i Woo, 2010: 214) pokazala se kao najbolja metoda za postizanje cilja istraživanja.

Kako joj je zadaća veliku količinu sadržaja kategorizirati u rubrike te tako dobiti numeričke podatke o učestalosti pojavljivanja određenih sadržaja, glavne su joj zamjerke objektivnost i problem sažimanja velikog broja sadržaja u samo nekoliko kategorija. Kako bi se testirala ispravnost matrice te dokazala relevantnost podataka, provedeno je pilot-istraživanje na manjem broju nasumično izabranih priloga. Objektivnost u metodi analize sadržaja ovisi o konkretnosti i jasnoći kategorija postavljenih u matrici.

Selekcija priloga i definiranje konačnog uzorka

Sljedeći je korak bio odlučiti koje emisije i priloge analizirati. Središnje informativne emisije Hrvatske televizije i Nove TV izabrane su zbog najveće gledanosti. Dnevnik Nove

⁹ AGB Nielsen Media Research, rujan 2012.

¹⁰ Prema podatcima Pew Research, „News Media Trends“, studeni 2013.

¹¹ Prema podatcima Centra za istraživanje tržišta GfK, lipanj 2011.

TV posljednjih je nekoliko godina postao najgledanija emisija u Hrvatskoj te je tako oduzeo dominaciju HTV-u čiji Dnevnik je imao tu titulu gotovo dva desetljeća. Rezultati istraživanja nezavisne agencije AGB Nielsen Media Research pokazuju da središnja informativna emisija Nove TV vodi u gledanosti s 13,9 % gledatelja. Dnevnik HTV-a zaostaje za konkurentima sa samo 9,3 % gledatelja tijekom mjeseca rujna 2012. godine.

Središnja informativna emisija HTV-a u radu je uzeta kao primjer središnje informativne emisije javne televizije, dok je Dnevnik Nove TV uzet kao primjer središnje informativne emisije komercijalne televizije.

Analiza je provedena u periodu od 1. ožujka do 31. svibnja 2013. godine. U tom razdoblju analizirane su središnje informativne emisije Hrvatske televizije i Nove TV. Istraživanje je uključivalo 3313 priloga¹² u 184 središnje informativne emisije HTV-a i Nove TV.

Za provođenje pilot-istraživanja uzet je uzorak od 10 priloga, a analiza je trebala pokazati valjanost istraživanja i postavljene matrice.

Test pouzdanosti

Test pouzdanosti ili "reproduktivnosti" odnosi se na ideju da različiti ljudi mogu na isti način kodirati isti tekst koristeći istu matricu (Weber, 1990: 17). Koristeći Holstijevu metodu, napravili smo test pouzdanosti s dva nezavisna koda na 10 slučajno odabranih priloga iz ukupnog uzorka. Rezultati pilot-istraživanja varirali su po kategorijama od 0,80 do 1,00, s tim da prosječni rezultat za sve kategorije iznosi 0,97.

Plan istraživanja

Istraživanje je prevedeno na 92 središnje informativne emisije HTV-a i 92 središnje informativne emisije Nove TV. Dnevnik HTV-a analiziran je na njihovoj mrežnoj stranici u rubrici Televizija na zahtjev, dok je Dnevnik Nove TV analiziran preko televizijskih audiovizualnih kartica (AV kartica)¹³ emisija emitiranih u ožujku, travnju i svibnju 2013. godine. Matrica je bila podijeljena u dva dijela. Prvi dio analizirao je opću kategoriju priloga u kojem se spominju društvene mreže. Drugi dio namijenjen je dubljoj analizi rezultata, vezano za navođenje objava s društvenih mreža.

U prvom dijelu primarna je namjera bila utvrditi spominju li se u vijesti društvene mreže i, ako da, kojoj kategoriji ta vijest pripada te kojoj vrsti priloga. Pod kategorijom se podrazumijevala rubrika u koju vijest pripada: unutarnja ili vanjska politika, gospodarstvo, kultura ili zabava. Pod vrstom priloga podrazumijevala se kratka vijest, prilog, reportaža... Nadalje, pokušali smo ispitati na koji se način društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti te u kojem je fokusu spomenuta društvena mreža u navedenom prilogu.


¹² Pod prilogom se podrazumijeva informativna zasebna cjelina u emisiji vijesti.

¹³ Audiovizualna kartica – standardizirani tekstualni zapis o sadržaju TV priloga.

REZULTATI

Usporedba HTV-a i Nove TV


Od ukupno analiziranih 3313 priloga, rezultati pokazuju da se u samo 1,6 % slučajeva društvene mreže spominju kao izvor vijesti u prilogima. Od ukupnog broja analiziranih priloga na HTV-u (1332), za njih 14 navelo se društvene mreže kao izvor informacija, što je ukupno 1,05 % priloga u središnjoj informativnoj emisiji. Na Novoj TV od ukupnog broja analiziranih priloga (1981), za njih 39 navelo se društvene mreže kao izvor vijesti, što je ukupno 2 % priloga u središnjoj informativnoj emisiji (Grafikon 1).



▲ Grafikon 1.
Navođenje društvenih mreža kao izvora vijesti

Nadalje, rezultati pokazuju da su u ispitanom razdoblju novinari koristili društvene mreže kao izvor informacija većinom za ozbiljne društveno-političke ili ekonomske vijesti (engl. *hard news*), i to pretežno vijesti iz unutarnje politike i zbivanja iz zemlje, čak u 33 % slučajeva. Za vijesti iz zabave društvene su mreže korištene kao izvor informacija u samo 23 % priloga.


Zanimljiv je podatak da je HTV u čak 45 % analiziranih priloga u kojima se društvene mreže spominju kao izvor informacija te podatke koristila u obradi ozbiljnih društveno-političkih ili ekonomskih vijesti, dok je na Novoj TV zabilježena češća praksa korištenja informacija s društvenih mreža za zabavne sadržaje. Odnos kategorija vijesti u kojima se društvene mreže koriste kao izvor informacije zorno prikazuje Grafikon 2.



▲ Grafikon 2.
Kategorija priloga u kojem se društvena mreža navodi kao izvor vijesti

Također, situacije kao što su spominjanje društvenih mreža u najavi priloga u studiju ili uvodnoj špici emisije pokazale su se malobrojnim u Dnevnicima HTV-a. Analiza je zabilježila samo 2 priloga (od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima su društvene mreže izvor vijesti) koja su se u najavi vijesti referirala na društvene mreže. Što se tiče prakse izričitog navođenja društvenih mreža kao izvora informacije, to je u većem broju slučajeva zabilježeno na Novoj TV, u čak 82 % priloga (od ukupnog broja priloga u kojem se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti), dok je na HTV-u analiza zabilježila ovu praksu u 57 % vijesti (od ukupnog broja priloga u kojem se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti).

U većini slučajeva na javnoj televiziji preuzimanje objava s društvenih mreža ne podrazumijeva citiranje, već su takve informacije parafrazirane. Citiranje objave s društvenih mreža prilično se rijetko koristi; tako su na HTV-u zabilježene samo tri vijesti u kojima su se objave s društvenih mreža doslovno prenijele od ukupno 14 vijesti u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti. S druge strane, 79 % priloga na HTV-u parafraziralo je objavu s društvenih mreža koja je bila izvor vijesti. U znatnom dijelu analiziranih priloga na Novoj TV voditelji su također prepričali objavu koju su preuzeli s društvenih mreža. No, nije zanemariv podatak da se na komercijalnoj televiziji od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor informacije u 28 % slučajeva objava doslovno citirala u prilogu (Grafikon 3).




▲ Grafikon 3.

Preuzimanje objava s društvenih mreža u prilogima središnjih informativnih emisija

Kada govorimo o relevantnosti društvenih mreža kao izvora informacija, zanimljiv je podatak da na HTV-u društvene mreže ni u jednom prilogu nisu navedene kao prvi izvor vijesti, već samo kao nadopuna glavnom izvoru vijesti. Drukčija praksa zabilježena je na Novoj TV. Iako se, jednako kao na HTV-u, u većini slučajeva dodatni izvor navodi kao potvrda informacije s društvene mreže, ne mogu se zanemariti 2 od ukupno 39 priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao glavni i jedini izvor informacije.

Konačno, kada govorimo o društvenoj mreži koja se najčešće koristi kao izvor informacija, podatci se razlikuju za javnu i komercijalnu televiziju. I dok na Novoj TV podatci govore u prilog Facebooku s kojeg je preuzeto čak 38 % informacija od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti, na HTV-u je korištenje najpopularnijih društvenih mreža (Facebooka i Twittera) kao izvora informacija zabilježeno u jednakom omjeru od 28 % (od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti). Ipak, na HTV-u je zabilježen najveći broj vijesti u kojima se društvene mreže općenito navode kao izvor vijesti, bez pozivanja na konkretnu društvenu mrežu. Od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor informacije takva je situacija zabilježena u 36 % slučajeva.

Iako su na javnoj televiziji informacije s drugih društvenih mreža zanemarive, na Novoj TV je u 13 % priloga zabilježeno prenošenje vijesti s YouTubea. Analiza je pokazala da ni HTV ni Nova TV nemaju praksu preuzimanja vijesti s ostalih društvenih mreža, kao što su Instagram, Pinterest ili Google +, u svojim prilogima.



▲ *Grafikon 4.*
Najčešće korištene mreže kao izvor informacija

Konačno, analiza je zabilježila samo jedan slučaj na javnoj i jedan na komercijalnoj televiziji u kojima se gledatelje upućivalo na društvene mreže za dodatne informacije ili raspravu o vijesti.

RASPRAVA

Analiza priloga središnjih informativnih emisija Hrvatske televizije i Nove TV emitiranih u ožujku, travnju i svibnju 2013. godine pokazuje da su navedene televizijske kuće prepoznale važnost društvenih mreža te da su ih počele koristiti kao izvor vijesti u svojim emisijama. Nova TV kao komercijalna televizija češće navodi društvene mreže kao izvor informacija u svojim prilogima nego što je to praksa na javnoj televiziji. Tako se od ukupnog broja analiziranih priloga na obje televizije na Novoj TV društvene mreže spominju kao izvor informacija u 2 % priloga, dok se na HTV-u spominju u 1,05 % priloga.

Istraživanjem je utvrđena razlika u navođenju i obradi vijesti između javne i komercijalne televizije. Osim što komercijalna televizija češće preuzima vijesti s društvenih mreža, također ima i češću praksu spomenuti društvene mreže u najavi priloga nego što je to slučaj kod javne televizije. Analiza je pokazala da ima slučajeve u kojima za istu vijest Nova TV navede društvene mreže kao izvor vijesti, dok ih, s druge strane, HTV u svom prilogu ni ne spomene. Primjerice, 8. ožujka 2013. ministar poduzetništva i obrta Gordan Maras usprotivio se putem Twittera prijedlogu ministra financija Slavka Linića o novom načinu plaćanja PDV-a. Novinarima Nove TV objava je bila zanimljiva zbog toga što se radilo o ministrima iz iste stranke te su obavijest citirali s društvene mreže i potkrijepili je dodatnim izvorima, dok je na HTV-u prilog obrađen bez navođenja društvenih mreža u ijednom kontekstu.

Također, u svibnju za vrijeme trajanja predizborne kampanje za lokalne izbore u obje središnje informativne emisije su se prenosile informacije o „pršutingu“ – trendu koji je nastao zbog neozbiljnog ponašanja tada aktualnoga splitskoga gradonačelnika Željka Keruma. Na Novoj TV jasno je naznačeno da je se taj trend proširio zahvaljujući društvenim mrežama, dok se na HTV-u vijest spomenula u emisiji, ali se nije referiralo na društvene mreže kao izvor informacija.

Razlika između HTV-a i Nove TV pojavila se i u pozicioniranju teme društvenih mreža u odnosu na ostatak priloga. Tako su u većini priloga na HTV-u (od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti) društvene mreže navedene kao važan element priče, ali se izbjegavalo referirati na njih kao na relevantan izvor informacija. Nova TV pokazala je drukčiju praksu. Osim što je češće preuzimala vijesti s društvenih mreža, u svojim prilozima također ih je češće navela kao relevantan izvor informacija te je češće citirala objave s društvenih platformi. Analiza je pokazala zanimljivu praksu na Novoj TV gdje se često na dnu ekrana na pokretnom *banneru* tijekom cijele emisije gledatelje upućivalo da se pridruže Facebook-profilu i Twitter-profilu emisije.

Analiza navođenja drugih izvora vijesti u prilogima u kojima su kao izvor vijesti poslužile društvene mreže također je dala zanimljive podatke: u 5 % slučajeva (od ukupnog broja priloga u kojima se društvene mreže navode kao izvor vijesti) Nova TV pokazala je praksu navođenja društvenih mreža kao jedinog izvora vijesti, kao što je bilo u slučaju predstavljanja novog predsjednika uprave Brodosplita, Tomislava Debeljaka, koji se radnicima odlučio obraćati isključivo preko Facebooka. Nova TV navela je njegovu objavu kao glavni izvor informacija. HTV je vijest koncipirao tako da se cijeli prilog sastojao od izjava članova Uprave i radnika, bez spominjanja Facebooka, društvenih mreža ili Debeljakove objave. Također, u tu kategoriju pripada i zabavna vijest na Novoj TV preuzeta s YouTubea o avanturistu koji je svoje putovanje snimao i objavljivao isključivo na toj društvenoj mreži, odakle je vijest prenesena.

Nadalje, razlika je zapažena i u dosljednosti navođenja izvora informacije preuzete s društvenih mreža. Na HTV-u se u ožujku za video Zdravka Mamića u kojem je imao rasističke izjave navelo da je materijal preuzet s YouTubea, dok se u travnju za ponovnu upotrebu istog videomaterijala izvor nije naveo.

Konačno, sve navedeno upućuje na činjenicu da su se društvene mreže počele koristiti kao izvor vijesti u središnjim informativnim emisijama HTV-a i Nove TV, no pristupi tih dviju televizijskih kuća u navođenju društvenih platformi kao izvora informacija prilično su različiti. Dok Nova TV ima češću praksu navođenja društvenih mreža kao izvora vijesti u svojim prilozima, HTV društvene mreže rjeđe koristi i navodi kao izvor vijesti.

ZAKLJUČAK

U ovom radu htjeli smo ispitati koriste li se društvene mreže kao izvor informacija u najgledanijim središnjim informativnim emisijama te u kojoj mjeri. Zatim smo htjeli ispitati postoji li razlika u navođenju objava između javne i komercijalne televizije te koje društvene mreže se najčešće koriste za izvor vijesti.

Podatci dobiveni istraživanjem pokazuju da se od ukupnog broja analiziranih priloga (3313) u njih 53 jasno navelo da su izvor vijesti društvene mreže, što ukazuje na početni trend korištenja društvenih mreža kao izvora informacija u središnjim informativnim televizijskim emisijama. Rezultati pokazuju isto tako da su se u izvještavanju društvene mreže pretežno navodile kao važan element priče, ali ne isključivo i kao primarni izvor.

Analizom je zabilježena i stanovita razlika u korištenju društvenih mreža u izvještavanju na javnoj i komercijalnoj televiziji, što je prije svega posljedica različite prirode i različite dužnosti javne i komercijalne televizije te različitog gledateljstva kojem se javna i komercijalna televizija obraćaju. Prema istraživanju agencije AGB Nielsen Media Research javnu televiziju u Hrvatskoj najradije prate građani koji imaju 50 i više godina, dok mlađa publika češće izabire sadržaje komercijalne televizije. Navedeno istraživanje pokazalo je da Novu TV prate mlađi gledatelji, ispod 50 godina, a posebno gledatelji do 20 godina. S obzirom na publiku kojoj se obraćaju televizije prilagođavaju svoj sadržaj. Tako komercijalna televizija svojim gledateljima pruža više neformalnih informacija nego javna televizija čiji gledatelji očekuju sažet i jasan pregled vijesti. S obzirom na navedeno ne iznenađuje podatak o češćoj upotrebi društvenih mreža kao izvora informacija u vijestima Nove TV.

Iako se na HTV-u društvene mreže kao izvor češće koriste u temama unutarnje i vanjske politike te gospodarstva, Nova TV je u više priloga koristila izvore s društvenih mreža te ih je u više priloga navodila kao ključni izvor vijesti.

Nadalje, rezultati pokazuju da su televizijski novinari pretežno usmjereni na pretraživanje najpopularnijih društvenih mreža – Facebooka i Twittera. Zanimljiv je nalaz koji upućuje na sve veću važnost Twittera kao vrijednog izvora informacija, a to potvrđuje i statistika koja ukazuje da broj korisnika Twittera u Hrvatskoj rapidno raste.

Rezultati ovog istraživanja upućuju na to da se društvene mreže koriste u televizijskom novinarstvu. Društvene su mreže postale neizostavan alat prilikom pretraživanja informacija te u komunikaciji ključnih aktera s korisnicima koju novinari prate te potom koriste kao izvor za vijesti.

Ovo istraživanje jedno je od prvih koje se bavi analizom korištenja društvenih mreža kao izvora vijesti u hrvatskim središnjim informativnim emisijama.

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SOCIAL NETWORKS AS NEWS SOURCES IN CROATIA'S MOST VIEWED TELEVISION NEWSCASTS

Marija Volarević :: Domagoj Bebić

ABSTRACT *Assuming that journalists use social networks when searching for news, this paper represents one of the first studies to explore how often television journalists use social networks as news sources in the main television newscasts. Using content analysis, this paper examines news reports that mention social networks from 1 March to 31 May 2013, in the main Daily News on public service Croatian Television (HTV) and commercial national television channel Nova TV. The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which social media is used as a source for news by television journalists. The study shows that television journalists have started using social networks as news sources when searching for information and that they tend to use the information from the most popular social networks, Facebook and Twitter. The analysis points to substantial differences between HTV and Nova TV in reporting on events with information from social networks.*

KEY WORDS

SOCIAL NETWORK, TELEVISION, JOURNALISM, NEWS SOURCE, CROATIAN TELEVISION (HTV), NOVA TV

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PRIKAZI I

ANOTACIJE

BOOK REVIEWS

Robert W. McChesney

DIGITAL DISCONNECT: HOW CAPITALISM IS TURNING THE INTERNET AGAINST DEMOCRACY

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U svjetlu arapskog proljeća, društvenih pokreta u SAD-u i Europi te aktualnih skandala oko prisluškivanja američke Agencije za nacionalnu sigurnost ponovno su otvorena pitanja o demokratskim potencijalima interneta, ali i o korištenju interneta za kontrolu i nadzor. Robert W. McChesney, profesor političke ekonomije komunikacije sa Sveučilišta u Illinoisu, u svojoj novoj knjizi *Digital Disconnect* preispituje tu debatu, nazivajući suprotne tabore „internet-entuzijastima“ i „internet-skepticima“, te prikazuje razvoj interneta i posljedice tog razvoja za demokraciju u SAD-u. Entuzijasti nastavljaju dominantni narativ o internetu iz 90-ih godina prošloga stoljeća koji postulira da će internet unaprijediti demokraciju ostvarivanjem decentraliziranog i široko dostupnog pristupa informacijama izvan kontrole dotadašnjih medijskih monopola. Skeptici pak smatraju da se digitalne medije može kontrolirati i njima manipulirati kao i bilo kojim drugim medijem te da nema razloga vjerovati da će oni unaprijediti demokraciju; naprotiv, oni se mogu koristiti za društvenu kontrolu. Međutim, McChesney smatra da obje pozicije dijele istu temeljnu manu, to jest ne uvažavaju političko-ekonomski kontekst koji bi objasnio kako realni kapitalizam oblikuje društveni život: „način na koji kapitalizam djeluje (...) određuje ulogu koju bi internet mogao imati u društvu (...) svaki pokušaj da se razumije demokracija bez dovođenja u odnos s kapitalizmom je dvojben“ (13). Polazeći od političke ekonomije komunikacije McChesney daje originalan doprinos raspravi i nudi kritičku analizu značenja interneta za društvo i društvenu promjenu.

U drugom i trećem poglavlju McChesney uvodi elemente političke ekonomije i političke ekonomije komunikacije. Preispituje doktrine slobodnog tržišta koje naziva „katekizmom“ i daje uvid u ono što smatra realnijim opisom kapitalističkog sustava u SAD-u, koncentrirajući se na rastuće ekonomske nejednakosti i koncentraciju ekonomske moći. McChesney smatra da kapitalistički sustav SAD-a ne dopušta dublju demokraciju, već samo natjecanje elita, dok većina građanstva ostaje depolitizirana i apatična, posebno oni na dnu ekonomske ljestvice. U promišljanju odnosa kapitalizma i demokracije McChesney dolazi do ključne teze ove knjige – da bi internet doista pridonio razvoju demokracije, morao bi doći u sukob s realnim kapitalizmom, odnosno djelovati protiv „nejednakosti, hiperkomercijalizacije, korupcije i depolitizacije“. Politička ekonomija komunikacije pokušava otkriti modele medijskih sustava koji najviše odgovaraju demokratskim vrijednostima, a na koje „katekizam“ slobodnog tržišta, prema McChesneyju, ne može odgovoriti. Komercijalni medijski sustav nije sustav slobodnog tržišta – država potiče i regulira medije dodjeljivanjem koncesija i izravnim ili neizravnim subvencioniranjem (primjerice ne oporezujući prihode od oglašavanja), štiti intelektualno vlasništvo te deregulacijom omogućava stvaranje monopola. Također, samo tržište nije dovoljno za osiguravanje kvalitetnog novinarstva koje bi odgovaralo demokratskim načelima „koje bi kontroliralo one na pozicijama moći, koje bi služilo otkrivanju istine, odnosno razotkrivanju laži, zadovoljilo informacijske potrebe svih građana, a posebice onih s najmanje ekonomske i političke moći, te proizvelo širok raspon informiranih mišljenja o najvažnijim društvenim i političkim pitanjima da bi se ostvarilo informirano građansko sudjelovanje u politici“ (83).

U četvrtom i petom poglavlju McChesney opisuje kako je internet od nekomercijalne institucije brojnim promjenama politika i uz sudjelovanje vladinih institucija i korporacija transformiran u komercijalnu instituciju većinom u vlasništvu privatnog sektora. Kapitalističko preuzimanje interneta odvijalo se pod uvjerenjem da će internetske tehnologije dovesti do savršene tržišne konkurencije te da stoga nema potrebe za državnom regulacijom. Međutim, McChesney tvrdi da je deregulacija donijela samo uklanjanje regulacije s ciljem javnog interesa, a s posljedicom jačanja monopola u medijskim i telekomunikacijskim industrijama koje se sve manje regulira. Najnovije komunikacijske politike ugrožavaju načela neutralnosti mreže pod kojima je internet do sad djelovao i omogućavaju privatnim vlasnicima sve širu kontrolu tog prostora, a brz razvoj novih tehnologija čini pokušaje regulacije sve složenijima. McChesney daje pregled monopolističkih „digitalnih divova“ koji danas vladaju internetskim prostorom te zaključuje da su dostignuća „tehnološkog razvoja informacijskog doba gotovo potpuno preuzeta od strane sićušne elite“ (131). Zakoni koji reguliraju zaštitu intelektualnog vlasništva potiču razvoj monopola i postaju „najvažnija politika koja potiče sveukupnu privatizaciju zajedničke kulture“ (80). McChesney prikazuje i načine na koje pružatelji usluga na internetu narušavaju prava na privatnost svojih korisnika, zbog sve sofisticiranijih tehnika oglašavanja i u suradnji s vojnim i sigurnosnim agencijama.

Poglavlje *Journalism is dead! Long live journalism?* trebalo bi biti najzanimljivije studentima novinarstva kao analiza uzroka i posljedica krize u kojoj se novinarstvo danas nalazi. McChesney pokazuje da oslabljeno tradicionalno novinarstvo nije nadomješteno novim modelima u novim medijima, već da je internet samo produbio tenzije između novinarstva i komercijalizma. Potplaćenost novinara, prekarni rad i fokusiranje na zabavne sadržaje ne pridonosi novinarstvu koje bi trebalo služiti demokraciji. Takozvano građansko novinarstvo u kojem mnogi vide novi model nezavisnog novinarstva McChesney naziva eufemizmom za neplaćeni rad. Kvalitetno novinarstvo može se pronaći u neprofitnom sektoru, no taj sektor ne može jamčiti dugoročnu financijsku održivost i nezavisnost od institucija koje ga financiraju, kao ni osigurati sigurno zaposlenje i plaću novinara. McChesney u ovom poglavlju predlaže novi model financiranja digitalnih medija putem građanskih vaučera koji će osigurati resurse nužne za stvaranje kvalitetnog novinarstva. Prema tom modelu svaki bi građanin iskoristio vaučer za donaciju neprofitnom mediju po svojoj želji – takvim modelom ograničio bi se državni utjecaj na medije i utjecaj oglašivača, a kvalitetni bi mediji imali održiv poslovni model i dovoljno financijskih resursa za zapošljavanje novinara.

U posljednjem poglavlju McChesney na temelju svoje analize daje pregled reformi medijskih politika koje su prijeko potrebne za ostvarivanje javnog interesa, a tiču se medijske pismenosti, regulacije oglašavanja, razvoja neprofitnog sektora, ograničenja nadzora i zaštite privatnosti. Budući da su navedene reforme u sukobu s postojećim poslovnim modelima i interesima vodećih medijskih korporacija, McChesney postavlja pitanje može li se internet reformirati s ciljem da postane javno dobro bez napuštanja tržišnog modela. Knjiga *Digital Disconnect* daje trezveniji opis razvoja interneta od uobičajenih analiza „internet-entuzijasta“ te je neizostavno štivo za studente novinarstva i sve koje zanima sustavnija analiza kritične prekretnice u razvoju suvremenih medijskih industrija i interneta.

Nico Carpentier, Kim Christian Schröder i Lawrie Hallett

AUDIENCE TRANSFORMATIONS: SHIFTING AUDIENCE POSITIONS IN LATE MODERNITY

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Knjigu *Audience Transformations: Shifting Audience Positions in Late Modernity* uredili su Nico Carpentier, Kim Christian Schröder i Lawrie Hallett. Urednici su na jednom mjestu okupili znanstvene tekstove autora koji se bave istraživanjem publika u kasnom modernizmu, odnosno postmodernizmu. Knjiga je podijeljena na četiri tematske cjeline. Prva cjelina bavi se uporabom medija (*Using the Media*), druga se bavi kompleksnim medijskim strukturama, treća se odnosi na participaciju u medijima i kroz medije, a posljednja je posvećena preduvjetima participacije, odnosno mogućnostima pristupa medijskoj pismenosti te povjerenju u medije.

Na izuzetno zanimljiv način autori u svojim tekstovima tradicionalne pristupe pojedinim segmentima medijskih publika nadopunjavaju recentnim istraživanjima i novim pogledima. Puno se pozornosti posvećuje novim medijima, odnosno internetu koji je uvelike promijenio način na koji se (medijske) publike promatra u znanosti. U prvoj cjelini, koja govori o uporabi medija, autori govore o krosmedijskoj uporabi koju je uzrokovala konvergencija medija. Konvergencijom medija izbrisane su granice između tradicionalnih i novih medija. Posljedica digitalne konvergencije (pametni telefoni i ICT sektor) jest, prema autorima, medijski prostor u kojem je sve lakše birati između pojedinih medija ili ih kombinirati, a na taj način izbjegnuta su ograničenja koja su postavljali tradicionalni mediji. Govori se također i o žanrovskoj analizi medijskih tekstova u kojoj je, zbog pojave novih medijskih oblika, potrebno uvesti neke nove pristupe. Naime, fenomen krosplatformskih i multiplatformskih tekstova rezultirao je kompleksnošću u narativnoj analizi tekstova. Što se pak uloge medija u obiteljima tiče, ona se, prema autorima, drastično promijenila pojavom interneta, a posebno Weba 2.0, odnosno pojavom društvenih mreža. Fokus su socijalno disfunkcionalne obitelji na kojima je provedena studija slučaja. Rezultati su pokazali da mediji mogu na jednak način pomoći i odmoći djeci u takvim obiteljima.

Druga cjelina, koja se bavi kompleksnim strukturama u promatranju publika, posvećena je istraživanju medija i generacija, etničkim manjinama i konzumaciji medijatiziranog sadržaja. U istraživanjima generacija razlikuju se oni koji su rođeni u suvremenom digitalnom svijetu (*digital natives*) od onih koji su rođeni prije razdoblja u kojem se pojavio internet (*digital immigrants*). Međutim, iako postoje istraživanja koja pokazuju kako se mlađe generacije (one rođene u doba interneta) više koriste internetom i bolje se snalaze na njemu, u znanstvenom diskursu bilo bi nespretno promatrati korištenje novih medijskih tehnologija iz samo jedne perspektive pa se tako osim generacijskog pristupa koristi i onaj tehnološki. Kada govorimo o manjinskim medijskim publikama, postoji pretpostavka da takve publike u zemljama koje su naselili gledaju programe javnih medijskih servisa jer postoji obaveza istih da emitiraju programe namijenjene upravo njima. No, istraživanja gledanosti televizijskih programa u zemljama Europske unije pokazala su da etničke manjine ipak najviše gledaju program komercijalnih televizijskih postaja, a suvremena satelitska tehnologija omogućuje im da programe svojih zemalja gledaju gdje god se nalazili. Treće poglavlje donosi pregled interakcije, participacije i konzumacije medijatiziranog sadržaja. Procesom medijatizacije, prema autorima teksta, naziva se proces u kojem mediji postaju

institucija sami za sebe. Tim procesom pojavljuje se i pojam medijaliziranih publika što označava društva kojima mediji čine središnji element u procesu socijalne interakcije.

Treća se cjelina bavi participacijom u medijima i kroz medije. U prvom poglavlju govori se o razvoju demokracije kroz medije, a kao primjer uzimaju se zemlje zapadne demokracije zato što se u njima najjasnije očituju elementi suvremene demokracije. Politička i medijska participacija dva su pojma koja se međusobno isprepliću. Kako medijska sfera služi kao platforma za razmjenu mišljenja i stavova te interakciju s ostalim sudionicima, ona zadire u sferu političke participacije, odnosno onoga što čini političku participaciju. Nadalje, govori se o novim medijima i tome kako novi mediji (prvenstveno internet) doprinose političkoj participaciji. Prvenstveno se proučava fenomen blogova, kao nov način izražavanja stavova, a također i društvenih mreža. Facebook, Twitter i YouTube snažni su alati za izražavanje političkih i društvenih stavova, a time se potiče politička participacija građana. No, autori naglašavaju da možemo govoriti i o pasiviziranju medijskih publika, s obzirom na to da se ovdje radi o političkoj participaciji koja se odvija isključivo *online* te da su tradicionalni oblici političke participacije zanemareni. Aktivizam publika važan je element ovog poglavlja. Naime, masovni prosvjedi koji su se primjerice odvijali u Egiptu i Libiji organizirani su i vođeni putem Facebooka i Twittera. Društvene mreže u segmentu organizacije prosvjeda preuzele su primat. Posljednji tekst referira se na postojanje fenomena u kojem participacija u očima medijskih industrija postaje proizvod. Najbolji primjer za to jest *user generated content*, odnosno vrsta građanske participacije u kojoj građani postavljaju svoje snimke, fotografije ili tekstove na internetske stranice medija, koji potom nude određenu vrstu nagrade za vijesti koje budu obavljene i na taj način stvaraju proizvod.

Četvrta, a ujedno i posljednja cjelina knjige bavi se preduvjetima participacije, točnije mogućnostima pristupa, medijskom pismenosti i povjerenjem u medije. Mogućnost pristupa digitalnoj tehnologiji i internetu jedan je od osnovnih preduvjeta za participaciju u današnjem suvremenom medijskom okruženju. Socijalna nejednakost, pogotovo u siromašnijim zemljama, može biti uzrok ograničenog pristupa digitalnim tehnologijama, a jedan od uzroka jest i nemogućnost obrazovanja, s obzirom na to da je obrazovanje jedan od ključnih uvjeta za korištenje digitalnih tehnologija. Medijska pismenost naglašena je kao jedan od ključnih preduvjeta za participaciju u svijetu digitalnih tehnologija. Naime, medijska pismenost podrazumijeva znanje za korištenje digitalnih (medijskih) tehnologija te njihovo korištenje na ispravan način, kako ne bi došlo do zloupotreba. Autori se dotiču i problema promatranja medijske pismenosti isključivo kao kompetencija za korištenje digitalnih tehnologija, umjesto da se medijsku pismenost promatra u širem socioekonomskom kontekstu. Inzistira se na medijskoj pismenosti u današnjem suvremenom svijetu kako medijska i politička participacija ne bi otišle u pogrešnom smjeru te kako bi se i dalje poštivali temeljni postulati demokracije. Posljednje poglavlje propituje povjerenje u medije, institucije, profesionalno novinarstvo te žanrove. Pitanje povjerenja u današnjem suvremenom svijetu važno je zato što su u tradicionalnim medijima institucije kreirale pozicije na profesionalnim standardima, a u digitalnom svijetu takve su pozicije konstruirane od strane nas kao korisnika. Pitanje povjerenja u medije ovisi o onome što korisnici povezuju s njima. Prijašnja znanja, očekivanja i pretpostavke označavaju teritorij za ono što je poznato i definiraju individualno povjerenje.

Ova knjiga pisana je vrlo jednostavnim i jasnim stilom. Poslužiti će svakome tko krene u istraživanje o tim temama kao odlična podloga za daljnji rad. Autori u svojim tekstovi-

ma ostavljaju otvorena pojedina pitanja koja su podložna istraživanju te na taj način daju konkretne preporuke znanstvenicima, a i onima koji žele saznati nešto više o tim temama.

Ivan Nekić

Klaus Bredl, Julia Hünninger and Jakob Linaa Jensen (eds)

METHODS FOR ANALYZING SOCIAL MEDIA

Routledge, London and New York, 2014, 208 pp
ISBN13: 978-0-415-81832-2

Book *Methods for Analyzing Social Media* represents new publication of COST Action IS0906 „Transforming Audiences, Transforming Societies“. The editors of this book are Klaus Bredl and Julia Hünninger from the Department of Digital Media at the Institute of Media and Education at the University of Augsburg, and Jakob Linaa Jensen from the Department of Aesthetics and Communication, Media Studies and the Center for Internet Studies at the University of Aarhus. In the introduction, the editors point out the question: How can we analyze social media? The answer on that question is given through eleven chapters of the book and each of them represents independent article of various researchers.

Second chapter *The Open Laboratory: Limits and Possibilities of Using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube as a Research Data Source* is written by Fabio Giglietto, Luca Rossi and Davide Bennato. Their paper gives a brief insight on contemporary literature concerning social media research and methods, especially used for YouTube, Twitter and Facebook.

Research presented in the next chapter *Quantitative Approaches to Comparing Communication Patterns on Twitter* was conducted by Axel Bruns and Stefan Stieglitz and it shows how different and innovative metrics can be used for discovering user communication patterns on Twitter. Focusing their analysis on hashtags, authors are distinguishing three types of users on Twitter: *lead users, highly active users, and least active users.*

Communities of Communication: Making Sense of the "Social" in Social Media is the title of the fourth chapter and presents article of Pascal Jürgens. The author suggests that the concept of “communities” and their detection would simplify research in social media as a way for analyzing user behavior. This approach can be used as a starting point for further researches concerning behavior of social media users.

Tim Highfield is the author of the article *Talking of Many Things: Using Topical Networks to Study Discussions in Social Media*. He used mixed method approach for identifying topical networks in blogosphere. The author's analysis of discussions on specific topics opens possibility to better understand dynamics in online conversations.

Stine Lomborg proposes the use of web archiving methods as one of the possible solutions for audience research, in the sixth chapter *Researching Communicative Practice: Web Archiving in Qualitative Social Media Research*. He explains the method and applicability for studies concerning communicative practices in social media.

The following article *Social Navigation on the Internet: A Framework for the Analysis of Communication Processes* is written by Marco Lünich, Patrick Rössler and Lena Hautzer. The authors propose a multi-method approach which includes the use of in-depth interviews, online survey and online content analysis for exploring online communication.

Employing Creative Research Methods with Tweens in Estonia and Sweden: Reflections on a Case Study of Identity Construction on Social Networking Sites is the title of the chapter which gives an overview of creative research methods used for analysis of online identities on social networking sites. Authors Andra Siibak, Michael Forsman and Patrik Hernwall use creative research methods as an alternative to traditional methods which seem insufficient for researching relations among online audiences, authors and text.

Matthew Crick has investigated the social media use in Bronx by conducting research with mixed method approach. As the title of the chapter suggests *Social Media Use in the Bronx: New Research and Innovations in the Study of YouTube's Digital Neighborhood*, this study resulted with the notice that the respondents are not uploading videos too often and they are prone to re-edit or repurpose videos. The author's observation is that YouTube videos are used for learning and gaining knowledge.

Tenth chapter *Digital Media Stories Through Multimodal Analysis: A Case Study of Erahoneybee's Song About a Child Welfare Agency* is written by Tara La Rose. She observes digital media story *Song About a Child Welfare Agency* which was published on YouTube. The use of multimodal analysis helped in deconstructing the story.

Martine P. A. Bouman, Constance H. C. Drossaert and Marcel E. Pieterse are the authors of the last chapter *Mark My Words: The Design of an Innovative Methodology to Detect and Analyze Interpersonal Health Conversations in Web and Social Media*. The research project was designed for analyzing conversations about health in social media. Authors are applying innovative approach which consists of defining specific "markers" and text mining method for analyzing data.

This book, originally published as special issue of the *Journal of Technology in Human Services*, presents a serious academic work which can be used as a handbook for discovering social media methods. Various scientific articles that are available in the book will surely be a valuable source of information for observing communication in social media. The authors are using innovative approaches for analyzing social media and therefore are revealing new areas where this recent methods can be applied.

Hrvoje Jakopović

Kelly McBride i Tom Rosenstiel (ur.)

THE NEW ETHICS OF JOURNALISM: PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

CQ Press (an imprint of SAGE), Washington, DC, 2013., 243 str.

ISBN 9781604265613

Iako se novinarstvo suočava s velikim izazovima, ono i dalje ima dužnost poštivati etička načela i služiti javnosti. Upravo je to osnovna premisa koju ističe Bob Steele u predgovoru knjige *The New Ethics of Journalism: Principles for the 21st Century*. U uvodu urednici knjige Kelly McBride i Tom Rosenstiel naglašavaju kako se u njoj ne pokušava predvidjeti budućnost (iako epilog knjige nosi naslov *Budućnost etike novinarstva*) niti se žali nad onim što je izgubljeno, već je riječ o pokušaju sagledavanja novinarstva u 21. stoljeću.

Knjiga je nastala kao rezultat rada instituta The Poynter Institute. Podijeljena je u tri dijela i nastavak je principa (koncepta) istinoljubivosti, nezavisnosti i minimiziranja štete, koje je

Institut razvio početkom 1990-ih godina. Svaki dio ima kratki uvod urednika, a ukupno je zastupljeno 14 autora. Riječ je o uvažanim stručnjacima iz područja medija – profesorima, znanstvenicima, dugogodišnjim novinarima i kolumnistima, a dio njih i sami su autori knjiga o medijima.

Prethodni koncepti Instituta razrađeni su i prilagođeni digitalnom dobu. Ipak, prvi dio knjige i dalje se odnosi na najvažniji princip novinarstva – istinu. Ona bi trebala biti najjednostavnija, ali je često i najkompliciranija zadaća novinarstva, ističu McBride i Rosenstiel. Prvi dio knjige donosi pet eseja čiji su autori: Clay Shirky, Roy Peter Clark, Tom Huang, Steve Myers i Kenny Irby.

Drugi dio knjige obrađuje transparentnost kroz pet eseja čiji su autori: Dan Gillmor, Gilad Lotan, Adam Hochberg, Ann Friedman i Craig Silverman. Za urednike transparentnost je novi koncept koji polako istiskuje neovisnost i približava se originalnom konceptu objektivnosti koji je u novinarstvo došao iz društvenih znanosti početkom 20. stoljeća. U svijetu u kojem je moguće doći do informacija iz mnoštva različitih izvora, ona postaje imperativ koji nije moguće ignorirati.

U uvodniku trećeg dijela zajednica se postavlja kao cilj u kojoj, u artikuliranju „seta ideja koje će voditi novinarstvo u budućnosti“, uloga grupe autora u odnosu na jednog postaje nezamjenjiva. Autori Steven Waldman, Danah Boyd i Kelly McBride, Eric Deggans i Monica Guzman obrađuju povezanost novinarstva i zajednice.

Svaki esej završava studijom slučaja autorice Caitlin Johnston (ukupno 14 primjera).

U epilogu knjige urednici se dotiču budućnosti etike. Knjiga također nudi kratke biografije svih autora, tekst o Institutu te kazalo pojmova i imena.

Ukratko, Bob Steele zaključuje kako je riječ o ključnoj knjizi koja se bavi „izuzetno važnom temom u kritičnom trenutku“.

Dunja Majstorović

Zlatiborka Popov-Momčinović

ŽENSKI POKRET U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI: ARTIKULACIJA JEDNE KONTRAKULTURE

Sarajevski otvoreni centar, Fondacija CURE i Centar za empirijska istraživanja religije u BiH, Sarajevo, 2013., 254 str.

ISBN 978-9958-536-14-4

Iako naslovom sugerira lokalni kontekst u kojem se razmatra aktivizam žena danas, ova je knjiga izuzetno zanimljivo i važno štivo za razumijevanje položaja žene u javnosti i/ili privatnosti, ne samo u Bosni i Hercegovini nego i općenito.² Knjiga se, naime, bavi fenomenom ženskog pokreta kao izuzetno značajnim akterom civilnog društva. Pritom autorica ne pristupa civilnom društvu na, već pomalo uobičajen, redukcionistički način (u smislu organizacija civilnog društva), nego ga smatra značajnim oblikom političkog organiziranja usmjerenog na konkretne i bitne društvene promjene. Autorica nas podsjeća na svojevrsnu „prirodnost“ nametanja ženskog pitanja i redefiniranja „klasične uloge“ žena upravo u kontekstu civilnog društva, kao slobodnog/slobodnijeg od političke sfere. Međutim, važnost djelovanja ženskog pokreta kao aktera civilnog društva ogleda se upravo u njegovoj mogućnosti utjecaja na političko i rekonceptualiziranja političkog.

² PDF verzija knjige dostupna je na: <http://soc.ba/zenski-pokret-u-bosni-i-hercegovini-artikulacija-jedne-kontrakulture/>

Kako autorica objašnjava, društveni pokreti izrazito su važna pokretačka snaga svakog civilnog društva, pa i društva općenito (naročito u njegovoj političkoj dimenziji), a ženski pokret (i generalno pozicija žene u društvenim pokretima, civilnom društvu te u društvenom i političkom diskursu) neizostavan je pri razmatranju društvenog razvoja u svim njegovim dimenzijama. Autorica ukazuje na specifičnosti bivanja civilno aktivnom ženom u dominantno patrijarhalnom društvu, postavljajući pitanje kada i kako su žene počele masovno i samosvjesno dizati glas protiv diskriminacije i nejednakih mogućnosti. Jednim od značajnih postignuća žena autorica smatra, na tragu Laclaua, destabiliziranje nekih temeljnih dihotomija, poput one o privatnom i javnom. Naime, dok je političko smatrano javnim (*res publica*), privatno je smatrano politički irelevantnim; zato je izuzetno važno da su aktivistice prepoznale da je i to depolitiziranje privatne sfere u svojoj biti političko, jer deprivira i isključuje različite društvene grupe, među kojima i žene. Autorica podsjeća da je feministički stav „privatno je političko“ revolucionarno utjecao na političku teoriju i praksu, jer je „preveo“ probleme s kojima se žene suočavaju (među kojima je, kao najekstremniji oblik, i nasilje nad ženama) u sferu javnog i učinio ih pitanjem od javnog značenja.

U tom kontekstu i kroz tu prizmu autorica promatra i povijesne pravce razvoja, ali i aktualno stanje ženskog pokreta u Bosni i Hercegovini. Prateći ga od austrougarskog doba (kada se, kako primjećuje autorica, zapravo tek i javlja ženski pokret u Bosni i Hercegovini) do danas, Zlatiborka Popov-Momčinović „vodi“ nas ne samo kroz formalne događaje i procese koji su taj pokret oblikovali nego objašnjava i temeljna pitanja rodne ravnopravnosti i emancipacije kojima se ženski pokret u Bosni i Hercegovini u različitim svojim fazama bavio. Posebno je važna njezina interpretacija različitih strategija (re)prezentacije žena i ženskog pokreta u različitim etapama i oblicima društvenog i/ili političkog sustava: ukazuje na činjenicu da je pitanje roda i rodne prezentacije u društvu često manipulativna kategorija. Ova (re)prezentacija ženskog pitanja ne odnosi se samo na medijsku i javnu sferu, nego i na sam ženski pokret i kretanja u njemu i oko njega.

U knjizi se konstatira da su se bosanskohercegovačke žene, unatoč pritiscima, manipulaciji i brojnim drugim poteškoćama u svom organiziranju i aktiviranju, uspjele izboriti za svoj prostor i javno djelovanje, postajući pokretačka snaga društvenog razvoja. Ono što je, međutim, značajno jest činjenica da autorica, iako i sama aktivistica i borkinja za ženska ljudska prava i aktivizam žena u društvu, ne pada u zamku idealiziranja i glorificiranja ženskog pokreta kroz povijest, uočavajući i ukazujući i na neke od negativnih pojava organiziranja žena i djelovanja za žene.

Ova knjiga dobar je primjer sretnog spoja preglednog teorijskog rada i izuzetnog istraživačkog napora autorice. Najznačajniji dio knjige svakako je empirijsko istraživanje autorice. Naime, autorica je dubinskim intervjuima s aktivistkinjama iz Bosne i Hercegovine pokušala doći do odgovora na pitanje postoji li uopće ženski pokret u BiH danas. Radeći na metodološki izvrsno zasnovanom istraživanju autorica je surađivala s više od petnaest nevladinih organizacija koje se bave pitanjima ženskih ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini. Upravo njihovi različiti odgovori, ponekad i izrazito polarizirani, ukazuju na potrebu intenzivnije i snažnije debate o ulozi žena u bosanskohercegovačkom društvu, o njihovu aktivizmu i angažmanu ne samo u civilnom društvu (u kojem su one, nesumnjivo, izrazito prisutne i angažirane) nego i (možda još i važnije) u politici. Ova će knjiga zasigurno potaknuti te debate i pridonijeti njihovoj kvaliteti svojom, na jasnim i značajnim argumentima zasnovanom, interpretacijom. Jer, kako autorica podcrtava od samog početka knjige,

zadatak je civilnog društva i njegovih aktera/akterki da iz temelja mijenja(ju) političko, a uloga žena u tom procesu nedvojbeno je značajna i u Bosni i Hercegovini, odnosno za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Knjiga Zlatiborke Popov-Momčinović *Ženski pokret u Bosni i Hercegovini: artikulacija jedne kontrakture* stoga, na sebi svojstven i specifičan način, pledira za snažnijim angažmanom žena i u bosanskohercegovačkom društvu i u bosanskohercegovačkoj politici.

„Praktičnu“ pomoć medijskim djelatnicima, manje upućenim interpretatorima bosanskohercegovačke društvene stvarnosti i onima koji se tek susreću s fenomenom ženskog aktivizma ova knjiga nudi u vidu rječnika ključnih pojmova za buduću operacionalizaciju pitanja ženskog pokreta i ženskog aktivizma. I on će, nadamo se, pridonijeti tome da teme iz domene ženskog aktivizma te ženskih ljudskih prava postanu još vidljivije te da budu prepoznate kao važne u javnoj sferi današnjice. A knjigu *Ženski pokret u Bosni i Hercegovini: artikulacija jedne kontrakture* treba čitati ne samo da bi se ženski aktivizam i ženski pokret bolje razumio nego i da bi se o njemu dalje u javnosti govorilo.

Lejla Turčilo

INFORMACIJE

INFORMATION



VI. međunarodna konferencija
Mostovi medijskog obrazovanja 2014.

Novi Sad, 23. i 24. svibnja 2014.

Šesta međunarodna konferencija „Mostovi medijskog obrazovanja 2014.“ bit će održana 23. i 24. svibnja 2014. na Filozofskom fakultetu u Novom Sadu.

Ovaj tradicionalni znanstveni skup organizira se kako bi se u razmjeni znanstvenih znanja i iskustava okupili istraživači iz Bosne i Hercegovine, Crne Gore, Hrvatske, Mađarske, Makedonije, Rumunjske, Slovačke, Slovenije, Srbije i drugih zemalja.

Teme ovogodišnje konferencije jesu:

- >medijsko obrazovanje
- >digitalizacija, mediji i javni interes
- >mediji i predizborne kampanje
- >rodna perspektiva i mediji
- >mediji i marginalizirane grupe
- >medijska pismenost
- >ekonomska održivost medija
- >teorijski i metodološki pristupi u medijskim studijama.

Na konferenciju se možete prijaviti tako što ćete poslati sažetak svoga rada i ključne riječi (najviše 250 riječi) na engleskom jeziku organizatorima (bridges.of.media.education@gmail.com) s temom e-pošte “Bridges of Media Education Conference 2014”.

Vaša prijava treba sadržavati naslovnu stranu s naslovom rada, imenom autora i podacima za kontakt.

Prijavu možete poslati najkasnije do **25. ožujka 2014. godine**. Naknadno pristigle prijave neće se razmatrati. Svi prijavljeni u zadanom roku dobit će povratnu informaciju o sudjelovanju najkasnije do **15. travnja 2014.**

Radni jezici konferencije su BHSC i engleski.

Kotizacija za sudjelovanje na konferenciji je 20 eura osim za sudionike na projektu Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije "Digitalne medijske tehnologije i društveno-obrazovne promene". Oni su oslobođeni plaćanja kotizacije. Sudionici iz inozemstva kotizaciju mogu uplatiti nakon dolaska u Srbiju, u nekoj od banaka, kako bi izbjegli visoke administrativne troškove uplate iz inozemstva.

Sudionici sami snose troškove putovanja i boravka. Odabrani i recenzirani radovi bit će objavljeni u zborniku koji će biti tiskan nakon Konferencije.

Za dodatne informacije obratite se na sljedeće kontakte:

Odsek za medijske studije
Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu
Dr Zorana Đinđića 2, 21000 Novi Sad, Srbija

bridges.of.media.education@gmail.com
zurnal@ff.uns.ac.rs

www.ff.uns.ac.rs
www.odsekazamedijskestudije.org

Nineteenth International Conference

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND JOURNALISM (ITJ 19)

Dubrovnik, 26 – 30 May, 2014.

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Nineteenth International Conference on *Information Technology and Journalism*, will take place at the *Inter-University Center* in Dubrovnik, May 26 – 30, 2014. The conference is organized by the **Institute for New Media and E-democracy (InMed)**, together with Department of Journalism; Faculty of Political Sciences, (University of Zagreb) and Department of Information Sciences, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, (University of Zagreb).

Main subject of the conference is: **Regulation and Freedom of New Media**

We also expect contributions on different connected themes, i.e.

Digital inclusion and digital exclusion

Is digital activism still alive?

What after SOPA, PIPA, ACTA and CISPA?

Online ethics: what are new rules

Glocalization of media

New business models in media industry: Experience with paywalls and other ways of newspaper revenue

IPSA's Research Committee 10 on Electronic democracy and Faculty of Political Science in partnership with DEL research network are organizing IPSA Workshop on **Innovations in Democracy: e-voting, e-campaigning, e-participation** on first two days of the Conference (26-27 May 2014). Following topics are announced:

- >E-voting
- >E-consultations
- >E-representatives
- >E-petitions
- >E-initiatives
- >E-referendum
- >Online deliberative polls
- >Online communities
- >E-campaigns
- >E-citizens

More information on: www.demokracija.hr

The deadline for submission of papers, presentations and posters for Conference is April 19, 2014.

Submissions should be send via *e-mail* to one of the directors' addresses. For presentations, please send us the title, author(s) name(s) and e-mail, institutional affiliation(s), and an abstract (150-300 words) written in English.

Registration deadline is May 16th, 2014.

We kindly ask all potential participants to register in advance. Those who are *not presenting* their research or applied work may register before May 16 if places are still available. The conference fee is 65€ for speakers, 80€ for participants without paper, and 50€ for students. The fee includes conference entry, proceedings and social program during the conference. Pre-conference social program is to be announced. Fee is payable at the conference in Dubrovnik.

For additional information contact the coordinator (or the directors of the conference):

The directors of the conference:

prof. dr. sc. Nenad Prelog
University of Zagreb, Department of Journalism; (Faculty of Political Sciences),
and **Institute for New Media and E-democracy**
e-mail: nenad@edemokracija.hr

prof. dr. sc. Damir Boras
University of Zagreb, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Information Sciences
e-mail: dboras@ffzg.hr

prof. dr. sc. Inoslav Bešker
University of Bologna
e-mail: inoslav@besker.com

Conference coordinator:

doc. dr. sc. Domagoj Bebić,
University of Zagreb, Department of Journalism; (Faculty of Political Sciences)
and **Institute for New Media and E-democracy**
e-mail: domagoj@edemokracija.hr

CALL FOR PAPERS

Under the High Auspices of the President of the Republic of Croatia Prof. Ivo Josipović
Centre for Croatian Studies, Department of Communication Sciences,
in Cooperation with the Electronic Media Council
Are Organizing
an International Scientific Conference

**Media Literacy in Digital Age –
Cultural, Economic and Political Perspective**

Zagreb, June 6-7, 2014

Media literacy - as a concept of empowering the citizens to efficiently deal with the world of traditional and new media, has been in the centre of interest of the international institutions, media experts and scientists for several decades already. UNESCO's Declaration on Media Education set the framework in the early eighties. Nineteen countries accepted the implementation and improvement of the concept of education for the new digital age, but this did not result in the expected inclusion of media literacy in the national educational systems. The European Union documents emphasize the importance of media literacy for the accomplishment of economic development and social cohesion of Europe by the year 2010, with the focus on the necessity of development of national public policy for the education of citizens in media. European citizens, notwithstanding their age and gender should be media-literate for their active involvement in the exchange of cultural goods and digital economic processes. In the field of human rights, media literacy should contribute to the divergence of freedom in society, political culture and democracy, as well as to the strengthening of the economic system and creative discourse.

In the process, key role is played by the public media services, regulatory bodies and educational institutions which are invited to participate and enable the public a better understanding and awareness of the media contents, processes, technologies and the system of regulation of traditional media such as radio, television, printed media as well as the Internet and the converged media (Ofcom, 2004).

We proudly invite you to participate in the discussion on these issues and to send us your theoretical or empirical research for the conference **Media Literacy in the Digital Age – Cultural, Economic and Political Perspective**.

Your scientific and professional contributions may involve the following issues:

- >What is media literacy and what is its position in relation to information literacy, digital literacy, media education, and media culture?
- >What is digital gap and is it possible the overcome it using media literacy?
- >Media education for children, parents, teachers and kindergarten teachers.
- >Media and information literacy and competitiveness on the European job market.
- >The future of traditional media.

- >The ethics of communication and the role of media literacy in the protection of privacy, the right to information and the freedom of public speech.
- >Participatory journalism.
- >The meaning of active use of media.
- >The meaning of critical use of media and the ability to critically analyse media contents.
- >The role of media literacy in the competitive digital economy.
- >Media literacy as the base of social involvement and the quality of life of the citizens of European Union.
- >The role of public media in the promotion of media literacy.
- >The role of non-profit media in the promotion of media literacy.
- >Media literacy in the educational system.
- >Media literacy and the protection of copyright.
- >Media literacy and the political culture of citizens.
- >Media literacy and the crises of society.

The official languages of the meeting are Croatian and English. Conference fee is 350 Croatian kunas (€50). Deadline for the submission of summaries in Croatian and English (250–300 words) is February 28, 2014. Please send the summaries to media.literacy@hrstud.hr. We will notify the participants on the acceptance of the paper by March 15, 2014. Full papers should be sent in English by June 30, 2014 to media.literacy@hrstud.hr. Papers will undergo double blind peer review and published in the conference collection of papers. Guide for authors will be available on the website of the conference. Selected papers will be published in the special edition of the *Media Research* journal (indexed in Sociological Abstracts (SA), Linguistic and Language Behavior Abstracts (LLBA) and Social Planning/Policy & Development Abstracts (SOPODA), Current Index to Journals in Education (CIJE), and SCOPUS).

The application form, information on accommodation, conference program and other information will be available on the Centre for Croatian Studies website www.hrstud.unizg.hr.

Conference Board: Nada Zgrabljčić Rotar, Damir Hajduk, Jelena Jurišić, Danijel Labaš. *Scientific Programme Board:* Nada Zgrabljčić Rotar, Jelena Jurišić, Danijel Labaš, Tomislav Janović, Ivan Burić, Blanka Jergović i Damir Hajduk. *Organization Assistance:* Ifigenija Račić, Anja Raguž, Lana Ciboci, Mirta Seferović i Matea Horvat. *IT Assistance:* Tomislav Knežević.

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CALL FOR PAPERS

Second Annual International CCCS Conference 2014

Media: Theory and Practice

Skopje, Macedonia, 4-6 September 2014

Supported by:

European Communication Research and Education Association
International Association for Media and Communication Research

The Centre for Culture and Cultural Studies (CCCS) invites proposals for papers, thematic panels and original media productions for **Second Annual International CCCS Conference 2014 'Media: Theory and Practice'**.

The aim of this conference revolves around a foundational impetus to shed greater light on all relevant aspects of media studies, including mass communication, media technology, the visual and the performing arts, TV, radio, WEB and print media, as well as other key components of media studies and mass communication.

We invite proposals based on media theory (particularly critical media studies and cultural studies), and proposals that consider the relationship between media and (popular) culture, politics, arts, new media, as pertinent fields of study.

We welcome submissions that offer original media productions: documentary films, fictionalized or non-narrative creative expressions. The submitted proposal needs to contain a creative or theoretical explanation of the submitted work. We invite projects by PhD students or submissions by teams of students and instructors (lecturers).

Hence, the Second Annual International CCCS Conference 2014 'Media: Theory and Practice' strives to offer a dialogic space for media theorists and practitioners. Along those lines, we invite media studies' theorists as well as practitioners to offer proposals through engaging and current ideas, paper topics, workshop presentations and round table discussions.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

Media Analyses

Content analysis / Media literacy / Media discourses

Critical Theory and Media Criticism

Media and hegemony / Media and globalization

Media and Political Communication

Media activism / Media and ideology / Media and democracy

Media and Law

(De)Regulation of media / Media and privacy / Media and copyright

Art and Media

Art-science interface / Media and aesthetics / Film / Theatre / The visual arts / The performing arts

Media and Culture

Media and gender / Diaspora, migrants and media / Media and ethnicity / Media and audience / Cultural populism / Cultural capital / Media and remembrance/forgetting / Media and identity / Media representation

New Media

Media and games / Social media / Digital activism / Media ecosystem / Multimedia

Journalism studies

Journalism and social and cultural representations / The role and status of journalism in the era of digital technology

Alternative and community media**Paper proposals**

For individual paper proposals, please fill out the following form

http://cultcenter.net/?wpgform_qv=registration-form-papers

Submissions for individual paper proposals should number to 250 words.

Panel proposals

Panel proposals are also welcomed, particularly those organized by internationally recognized experts aiming to bring together researchers on key topics for an interactive discussion among the panel members and the participants. Panels are an important component of CCCS's 2014 Conference. For panel proposals, please fill out the following form

http://cultcenter.net/?wpgform_qv=registration-form-panels

Submissions for panel proposals should include a 300-word abstract, for entire panel.

Important Dates and Fees

Deadline for abstracts submission: **1 March 2014**

Notifications of acceptance: **1 April 2014**

Deadline for full paper submission: **1 December 2014**

Early registration (till 1 May 2014): **€40**

Late registration (till 15 August 2014): **€60**

On-site registration (or after 15 August 2014): **€80**

The Conference will be held on **4-6 September, 2014** in Skopje, the Republic of Macedonia.

The registration fee includes: the welcome party, conference materials, an online publication of the abstracts, refreshment breaks. Full papers that have received a positive review will be published in the journals "Култура/Culture" and/or "Investigating Culture".

Official languages: English, Macedonian, Russian

For any further information please contact Dr. Mishel Pavlovski (mishel@cultcenter.net) or Dr. Loreta Georgievska Jakovleva (loreta@cultcenter.net)

The Centre for Culture and Cultural Studies

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Upute suradnicima

Medijske studije interdisciplinarni su časopis koji otvara prostor za međunarodnu znanstvenu i stručnu raspravu o medijima, komunikacijama, novinarstvu te odnosima s javnošću unutar kulturološkog, povijesnog, političkog i/ili ekonomskog konteksta. Na suradnju su pozvani autori čiji radovi (prilozi) ispunjavaju kriterij relevantnosti i znanstvene izvrsnosti. Radovi ne smiju biti djelomično ili u cijelosti već objavljeni, ne smiju biti u procesu objavljivanja u nekom drugom časopisu, zborniku, knjizi i sl., niti smiju biti prijevod takvih radova. Za sve navedeno autori preuzimaju odgovornost. Uvjet za objavu rada u časopisu jesu dvije anonimne, pozitivne recenzije međunarodnih medijskih stručnjaka. Radovi se šalju isključivo u DOC formatu elektroničkom poštom na adresu: ms@fpzg.hr. Zbog anonimnih recenzija u posebnom dokumentu treba poslati ime, odnosno imena autora/autorica s mjestom zaposlenja, podacima za kontakt (adresa/telefon/e-pošta) te kratku biografiju. Radovi moraju biti napisani na hrvatskom ili engleskom jeziku, fontom Times New Roman, veličina 12, prored 1,5. Sve stranice trebaju biti numerirane. Na prvoj stranici trebaju biti ispisani naslov rada te sažetak koji upućuje na zadaće i cilj rada, metode istraživanja te najvažnije rezultate (100 do 150 riječi s popisom ključnih 5 do 6 riječi), sve na hrvatskom i na engleskom jeziku. Očekivani opseg rada (uključujući bilješke, bibliografiju i mjesta za grafičke priloge) je između 5000 i 6000 riječi. Citirani izvori navode se u tekstu (a ne u bilješkama) u skraćenom obliku, npr. (Dahlgren, 2009: 67) ili (Gillespie i Toynbee, 2006). Na kraju teksta pod naslovom *Literatura* navodi se samo citirana literatura, abecednim redom.

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McQuail, Denis (2003) Public Service Broadcasting: Both Free and Accountable, *The Public/Javnost* 10 (3): 13-28.

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